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The Money or the Media? Lessons from 
Contrasting Developments in US and Australian 
Whistleblowing Laws 
Terry Morehead Dworkin 
Indiana University; Seattle University, United States 
A. J. Brown 
Griffith University, Australia* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Australia were both leaders in passing laws 
designed to protect whistleblowers and encourage whistleblowing.1 In the 
United States, the modern whistleblowing protection movement was buoyed 
by seminal events such as the explosion of the spaceship Challenger and the 
Watergate break-in that led to the resignation of President Nixon, which 
brought attention to the need for whistleblowing laws. In response to these 
events, Congress enacted the federal Inspector General Act2 and the Civil 
Service Reform Act (CSRA)3 in 1978 to protect whistleblowers and 
encourage reporting of problems. In the 1980s, the focus of the US 
                                                                                                                              
*  We thank the Australian-American Fulbright Commission and Griffith University for 
providing the grant funds that made this collaboration possible through Professor 
Dworkin’s visit to Australia as a Fulbright Visiting Senior Specialist in July 2010. 
1 “Whistleblowing” in this article is generally taken to mean disclosure by organization 
members (former or current) of “illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices . . . under the 
control of their employers to persons or organizations who may be able to affect action.” 
Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs, 
Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 687, 689 (1984). However, a variety of the statutes discussed herein, 
while targeted to or especially important for whistleblowers, may arise via non-
organization-member complainants. 
2 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–12 (2008). 
3 Civil Service Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
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whistleblower movement mainly shifted to the states;4 since the 1990s, 
whistleblowing laws have been enacted in all fifty states, but public sector 
law continued to be enacted at the federal level, with the passage of the 
1989 Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).5  
At the same time, in Australia, legislative action regarding 
whistleblowing law was triggered by the unraveling of systemic 
government corruption in the state of Queensland through the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry (1987–1989).6 By 1994, several Australian states had enacted 
whistleblower protection or public interest disclosure acts, and a federal 
parliamentary committee recommended similar action for the federal public 
sector as well as the private sector nationally.7 The Australian states 
followed the United States’ legislative approach relatively closely by 
establishing public sector laws based on an “anti-retaliation” model of 
whistleblower protection, albeit with the stronger adoption of an 
“institutional” or “structural” model of protection.8 
Today, whistleblowing law reform is again an active field in each 
country. The reasons, whether direct or indirect, for this resurgence of 
reform include the failure of the original anti-retaliation approach, to a 
                                                                                                                              
4 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State 
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 105 (2000) [hereinafter Callahan & 
Dworkin, Whistleblower Protection]. 
5 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1989). 
6 On the role of whistleblowing from the inception of Australia’s Fitzgerald Inquiry 
through over two decades of progress, see generally AJ Brown, Restoring the Sunshine to 
the Sunshine State: Priorities for Whistleblowing Law Reform in Queensland, 18 
GRIFFITH L. REV. 666, 666–89 (2009) [hereinafter Brown, Sunshine]. 
7 SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PUB. INTEREST WHISTLEBLOWING, IN THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST 
WHISTLEBLOWING (1994), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/ 
Committees/Senate_Committees?url=history/uwb_ctte/pi/index.htm [hereinafter SENATE 
SELECT COMM.]. 
8 See generally Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage 
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107 (2006) [hereinafter Moberly, 
Corporate Whistleblowers]. 
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significant degree in the United States and almost completely in Australia. 
When law reform trends in each country are analyzed, however, recent 
reform activity can be seen to stem not from systematic acknowledgement 
of that failure, but rather from a resolve to try different alternative measures 
with a greater degree of assumed effectiveness. In the United States, the 
increased use of statutory reward or bounty mechanisms reflects the 
perceived success of these measures, which encourage whistleblowing by 
compensating aggrieved whistleblowers, so long as they are eligible. This 
contrasts sharply with the approach taken in Australia, where there are no 
rewards, and where, in addition to the institutional or structural model, law 
reform has focused on legitimating whistleblowing to the media as a means 
of inducing change. 
This article analyzes this “second round” divergence of whistleblowing 
reform to extract its lessons for whistleblowing law reform in each country. 
Although the United States and Australia are post-colonial federations with 
similar constitutional structures, significant differences between the 
countries exist. A federal public sector whistleblowing regime has been 
much slower to materialize in any form in Australia, and efforts toward 
private sector whistleblowing regimes, even on the original anti-retaliation 
model, have been even slower. Regardless, a comparison of the 
whistleblowing laws of these two countries is helpful because it can help 
lead to more successful protection of whistleblowers and encourage 
reporting.  
The first part of the article charts the development of whistleblowing 
laws in the United States—and the movement toward rewards because of 
the relative success of the federal False Claims Act (FCA) since its revision 
in 1986—up to and including the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). The second part charts the 
development of Australian whistleblowing laws, up to and including new or 
amended Public Interest Disclosure Acts in four Australian jurisdictions 
between 2010 and 2012, as well as mooted federal reforms. The third part 
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of this article identifies four distinct legislative models or approaches at 
work through these aggregations of laws: anti-retaliation or organizational 
justice; reward or bounty; institutional or structural; and public or media. 
Measures that deploy these models, separately or in a mixture, provide 
different types of incentives, both to whistleblowers and to organizational or 
political responsiveness to whistleblowing. 
In conclusion, we argue that, in Australia, the failure of the original anti-
retaliation approach, and the need to supplement the institutional/structural 
approach, has led almost naturally to new attempts to try other approaches, 
and we predict that the reward approach will also now be taken up. In the 
United States, in light of the successful, but necessarily partial reach of the 
reward model, we predict that the institutional/structural approach, long 
pursued in Australia, is also likely to expand. This begs the question of 
whether, when, and how each country is likely to return to the fundamental 
problem of the substantial failure of the original anti-retaliation model. On 
this score, the answer in each country is likely to be different, but the 
objective remains the same. Overall, we argue that legislative efforts that 
effectively integrate and reconcile all these different approaches provide the 
most likely path to greater success in protecting whistleblowers and 
encouraging whistleblowing. 
II. THE MONEY? WHISTLEBLOWING LAW REFORM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. The Anti-Retaliation Model and Its Evolution 
Until the 1990s, legislative protection for whistleblowers consisted 
primarily of protection from retaliation, including the possibility of 
recovering wages and benefits, and jobs if they were lost due to 
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whistleblowing.9 Legislators assumed that fear of retaliation prevented 
observers of wrongdoing from reporting it and that barring retaliation would 
encourage whistleblowing, prevent retaliation, and discourage wrongdoing. 
While intuitively appealing, this has proven not to be the case.10 Indeed, the 
approach has been spectacularly unsuccessful in protecting whistleblowers. 
Most private-sector employees were employees at will;11 unless 
whistleblowers could sue in tort for termination in violation of public policy 
and recover punitive damages (not a widespread remedy at the time), the 
protection was inadequate.12 What about public-sector employees? 
1. The CSRA 
In 1978, the CSRA was passed to protect public sector whistleblowers.13 
Like all whistleblowing statutes, it banned retaliation, but it went further by 
also trying to make it easier to report and to deal with the information 
brought forward by whistleblowers. It presumed that if there was an 
effective, identified channel to report problems, which was known to 
                                                                                                                              
9 Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: 
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 
276 (1992) [hereinafter Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives]. 
10 MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 175–78 (1992). Social 
science studies indicate that factors such as open communication channels within 
organizations, a well-defined and understood way to blow the whistle within an 
organization, and belief that something will be done to correct the problem are more 
influential. Id. 
11 See ALFRED G. FELIU, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 1996). A private 
employee at will is one who works without a timed contract and can be fired at any time 
for any reason. Id. Public employees have some constitutional job security, and most 
unionized employees (which are now around 10 percent of US employees) are protected 
by a “just cause” contract clause. DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 
580–81 (11th ed. 2001). 
12 Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They 
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241 (1987).  
13 See Civil Service Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
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employees, whistleblowing would be easier and more likely.14 In an attempt 
to create this sort of channel, the CSRA created the Office of Special 
Counsel (OSC) to receive and assess reports regarding alleged 
governmental agency wrongdoing. If the OSC found a “substantial 
likelihood” of agency wrongdoing, it required the agency to investigate and 
give a report about its findings.15 The OSC then assessed the report and 
submitted it to Congress and the President, as well as kept a file of it.16 It 
was also supposed to act as an advocate for a whistleblower who suffered 
retaliation. Despite numerous revisions, and attempted revisions such as the 
passage of the WPA,17 this public sector anti-retaliation model, too, has 
generally proved unsuccessful in spurring whistleblowing or protecting 
whistleblowers.18 However, the recent passage of the Whistleblower 
Protection Enhancement Act of 201219 and a more active OSC20 may lead to 
greater success in the future. 
 
                                                                                                                              
14 Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8, at 1131–32. The legislation was an 
early model for what was later to be called the structural model of whistleblowing 
legislation. 
15 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(3)(A), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16 
(1989).  
16 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(5)(A). 
17 See 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1989). 
18 See, e.g., Press Release, Gov’t Accountability Project, Senate Approves 
Whistleblower Rights Breakthrough (June 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-release-archive/2006/1290-senate-approves-
whistleblower-rights-breakthrough (stating that the court had effectively gutted protection 
for whistleblowers by refusing to protect them); Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Alpin, 
Abuse of Authority: The Office of the Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4 
ANTIOCH L.J. 5, 25–26 (1986); Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1766–67 (2007); Rhonda McMillion, Aiding Whistle-Blowers, 
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 121 (quoting Rep. Patricia Schroeder, the OSC “lost sight of its 
mission”).  
19 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 
1465 (2012). 
20 See infra note 263. 
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2. Sarbanes-Oxley 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)21 is the most prominent of recent 
anti-retaliation legislation. Among its provisions, it contains elements of the 
structural model established by the CSRA (and discussed below).22 Like its 
predecessors, it has not proved very successful.23 SOX was passed in 
response to the wrongdoing, scandals, publicity and anger brought on by the 
actions of leaders of failed corporations such as Enron and WorldCom.24 
Whistleblowers were important in bringing the wrongdoing of these 
corporate leaders to light.25 They also testified at hearings before Congress 
about the law,26 and were intended to play a crucial role in SOX 
enforcement. This represented an acknowledgement by the US Congress of 
the importance of whistleblowing in the control, detection, and deterrence 
of wrongdoing in the financial sector. 
                                                                                                                              
21 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.). 
22 See Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8. 
23 See TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S 
SURVIVAL GUIDE 161–66 (2011).  
24 See, e.g., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BOARD OF DIRS. OF ENRON, 
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2002), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.find 
law.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 
CONN. L. REV. 915, 924–25 (2003). Other companies that collapsed relatively soon 
thereafter as a result of corporate greed include Global Crossing, Tyco, and Adelphia. Id. 
25 See Corporations Must Disclose Ethics Codes, Information on Financial Experts, SEC 
Says, 71 U.S.L.W. 2472 (Jan. 28, 2003). Indeed, of the three female whistleblowers 
named “People of the Year,” by Time Magazine in 2002, two, Sherron Watkins and 
Cynthia Cooper, blew the whistle on Enron and WorldCom, respectively. Richard Lacayo 
& Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html. See also Michael 
Orey, WorldCom-Inspired ‘Whistle-Blower’ Law Has Weaknesses, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 
2002, at B1. 
26 The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4098 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 107–146 (2002); see also JOHN 
BOSTELMAN, SARBANES OXLEY DESKBOOK 2–32 (2004).  Some private companies 
chose to comply because they considered it good business. Id. 
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SOX applies to publicly-traded companies,27 covers mail, wire, bank, and 
securities fraud, and requires companies to establish a code of ethics28 and 
whistleblowing procedures.29 Employees who reasonably believe that their 
information about a company concerns a covered violation have a right to 
report without retaliation.30 Unlike most of the state and federal 
whistleblowing statutes, SOX specifies different report recipients for 
internal and external whistleblowing in order for the whistleblower to be 
protected.31 It requires audit committees to establish company 
whistleblowing procedures whereby employee whistleblowers can 
anonymously submit issues of concern regarding questionable accounting 
or auditing matters.32 Further, it requires the committees to have procedures 
for retaining and treating the complaints. This structural model was seen as 
an improvement over earlier attempts to encourage whistleblowing and 
protect whistleblowers.33 
SOX protects whistleblowers from retaliation, broadly defines 
retaliation,34 and provides criminal penalties for retaliation.35 Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                              
27 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 
(2010) (broadening the class of covered employees); see infra notes 124–35 and 
accompanying text.  
28 15 U.S.C. § 7263(a) (2010). The ethics code must apply to top corporate officers. Id. 
29 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (2010). 
30 Virtually all state and federal whistleblowing legislation has similar reasonable belief 
standards. See Callahan & Dworkin, Whistleblower Protection, supra note 4, at 120–22. 
31 An internal report must go to someone with supervisory authority over the employee 
or to someone working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or 
terminate the wrongdoing. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, 
WHISTLEBLOWING 161 (2d ed. 2004).  
32 Jennifer Bjorhus, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Drives Demand for Whistle-Blower Hotline 
Services, PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 12, 2004, at D1. Most commonly, the response to this 
requirement has been for companies to contract with an independent hotline company to 
receive the complaints. Id. 
33 Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8, at 1110–12. 
34 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2002). Retaliation is defined as “knowingly” taking “any action 
harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood 
of any person.” Id.  
35 Id. at § 1513(b). 
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the many hundreds of SOX whistleblowers who have suffered retaliation 
have few meaningful remedies.  A few years after passage, studies of suits 
brought by SOX whistleblowers who suffered retaliation highlighted the 
Act’s failures.36 The lack of protection was particularly harmful because 
employees believed they were protected,37 yet most had been fired.38 Of the 
286 cases that went forward to an administrative law judge, only six (2 
percent) resulted in a decision for the employee.39 Another study of over 
seven hundred claims showed similar results40 and showed that an 
employee’s probability of success decreased over time.41 In 2006, none of 
the 159 cases that the hearing agency resolved resulted in a win for the 
                                                                                                                              
36 E.g., Beverly Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 20–21 (2007) “[T]he 
number of cases settled . . . suggests that complainants are fighting an uphill battle.” Id. 
One early study reported that through May of 2006, of the 677 completed Sarbanes-
Oxley retaliation complaints, 499 claims were dismissed, ninety-three claims settled, and 
ninety-five were withdrawn. Id. 
37 See id. at 17–18; Deborah Solomon, Risk Management: For Financial Whistle-
Blowers, New Shield is an Imperfect One; Claims of Employer Reprisal Go to OSHA 
Investigators Unschooled in Accounting; A Fired CFO Lingers in Limbo, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 4, 2004, at A1.  
38 82 percent had been fired. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An 
Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 65, 132 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations] (during the 
first three years of whistleblower complaints, only 3.6 percent of the whistleblowers who 
filed claims were successful in the administrative process, and only 6.5 percent on 
appeal). Even if successful, the complainant often must wait a long time before receiving 
anything. See Jayne O’Donnell, Blowing the Whistle Can Lead to Harsh Aftermath, 
Despite Law, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2005, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/ 
workplace/2005-07-31-whistle-usat_x.htm?csp=34 (detailing the ordeal of David 
Windhauser, the first employee ordered to be reinstated); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares 
Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552 (W.D. Va. 2006). 
39 Earle & Madek, supra note 36, at 22 (spanning from 2003 to May, 2006, there were 
thirty-three settlements). Id. at 23. 
40 Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 38(during the first three years of 
whistleblower complaints, only 3.6 percent of the whistleblowers who filed claims were 
successful in the administrative process, and only 6.5 percent on appeal). 
41 Id. at 91. 
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employee,42 and the subsequent results continued to be dismal.43 Few of the 
decisions turned on the merits of the whistleblower’s retaliation claim.44 
A detailed analysis of the failed claims showed a variety of reasons for 
the failures, including procedural complexity, misinterpretations of the 
statute’s burden of proof, interpretations that were as strict as possible 
against the whistleblower, very short statute of limitations (i.e., thirty days 
for an appeal), and others. As with the protection for public employees, 
blame also lies with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
(OSHA),45 the administrative agency designated to deal with complaints. It 
lacked sufficient resources, which resulted, among other things, in some 
whistleblowers not even being interviewed before a determination was 
made on their claims. A study released in January 2009 by the US 
                                                                                                                              
42 Id. at 91 n.126 (citing an e-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir. of the OSHA Office of 
Investigative Assistance, dated Oct. 3, 2006). OSHA’s fiscal year ended on September 
30, 2006. Id. at 126. As of September 4, 2008, 1,273 SOX retaliation complaints had 
been filed with the Department of Labor. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, US 
Whistleblowing:  A Decade of Progress?, in A GLOBAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST 
DISCLOSURE 40 (David B. Lewis ed., 2010). The Department found in favor of the 
complainants in less than 2 percent of the retaliation claims. Id. 
43 See  Lawrence S. Moy, et al., Whistleblower Claims Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS OF 2010 (2010). Between 2002 and 
summer 2008, 1,273 SOX complaints were filed with the Department of Labor. Id. 
Jennifer Levitz, Whistleblowers Are Left Dangling: Technicality Leads Labor 
Department to Dismiss Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2008, http://onlinewsj.com/article/ 
SB122048878500197393.html?mod=googlenewsws_wsj (stating that of the 1,273 SOX 
retaliation complaints filed, the department found in favor of the whistleblowers 
seventeen times); Tracy Coenen, The Failure of Whistleblower Protection under 
Sarbanes-Oxley, ALLBUSINESS, http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/fraud/4969189-
1.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2012) (reporting that roughly two-thirds of the claims were 
dismissed). 
44 See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 38, at 69–70.  
45 See Wendell H. Ford, Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. 
L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
Whistleblowers who suffer retaliation must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor 
who then refers it to OSHA for investigation. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1). An administrative 
law judge hears the evidence resulting from the investigation and renders a decision. Id. 
The decision can be appealed to the Administrative Review Board of the Department of 
Labor. Secretary’s Order 5-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 65008 (Oct. 22, 2002). 
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Government Accountability Office (GAO)46 added substance to this 
finding.47 Although Congress designated OSHA to handle SOX 
whistleblower complaints, it did not give the already overstretched agency 
any additional funding.48 Since SOX complaints comprise approximately 13 
percent of whistleblower claims received by OSHA,49 the SOX additions 
put a severe strain on OSHA’s resources, especially since OSHA employees 
had no experience dealing with the law.50 This was complicated further by a 
lack of information about what the agency was doing.51 
The GAO study found numerous deficiencies; for example, OSHA did 
not accurately keep its data and key dates were often inaccurately 
recorded,52 despite the fact that the laws mandate time limits for OSHA 
determinations (which were seldom met).53 One contributing factor was the 
lack of basic tools for investigators, such as laptops and cell phones, to use 
                                                                                                                              
46 The GAO did the study because it recognized that, “[w]orkers who ‘blow the whistle’ 
on prohibited practices play a role in enforcing federal laws,” but they face reprisals. U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM: BETTER 
DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY AND 
CONSISTENCY (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09106.pdf 
[hereinafter USGAO]. 
47 Id. It also found that whistleblowers received a favorable outcome in 21 percent of the 
complaints. Id. 
48 The agency was already overstretched because it dealt with whistleblower complaints 
based on sixteen other laws, from environmental laws to travel safety laws to 
employment safety law. Id. at 1. 
49 See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 38, at 125. 
50 See USGAO, supra note 46, at 8, for a list of the included laws. 
51 The GAO examined what was known about complaint processing times and what 
affected those times, what outcomes resulted, and the challenges OSHA faced in 
administering the program. Id. at 3. 
52 Id. at 15–18. Indeed, in one regional office none of the case-closed dates matched the 
files. Id. at 15.  
53 Id. at 17. OSHA has thirty to ninety days to complete its investigation and make an 
initial finding, depending on which of the fourteen statutes under which the 
whistleblower is seeking protection. Id. 
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in the field while investigating complaints.54 
A practical problem of SOX is the lack of an explicit provision55 in the 
law that allowed for the full range of damages for a whistleblower, 
including punitive damages or a reward structure, which would help offset 
the full costs of retaliation.56 This deterred lawyers from taking 
whistleblowers’ cases on a contingency basis. It also failed to lead to the 
growth of a specialized bar made up of lawyers specializing in 
whistleblower claims. The development of a specialized bar was important 
to the success of the revised FCA, which has been the most successful spur 
for whistleblowing so far.57 Several writers called for the provisions of 
significant rewards to make the law more effective.58 
Dodd-Frank59 was designed to remedy some of the flaws in SOX. Dodd-
Frank makes SOX more whistleblower-friendly by providing for the right to 
                                                                                                                              
54 Id. at 37. Based on these findings, the GAO’s recommendations went to some basic 
steps such as keeping accurate information and providing training and equipment, rather 
than more substantive reforms of the program. Id. at 42. 
55 SOX specifies that a whistleblower who successfully proves retaliation is entitled to 
“all relief necessary to make the employee whole.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1). This 
includes reinstatement, back pay and benefits, special damages such as attorneys’ and 
expert witness fees, and litigation costs. Id. at § 1514A(c)(2). While the language “all 
relief necessary” can be interpreted to allow for additional damages. See, e.g., Kalkunte 
v. DVI Financial Services, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-00056, 2005 WL 4889006, at *61 (U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor SAROX July 18, 2005) (front pay); Murray v. TXU Corp., No. 3:03-CV-
0888-P, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10298 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2005); MICHAEL DELIKAT, 
CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE SARBANES-OXLEY/DODD-FRANK ERA § 6:1.1 
(2006); see also Hanna v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 
(damage to reputation). Most courts do not follow such an interpretation).   
56 Indeed, Congress removed punitive damages language from the final version of the 
bill. See Murray v. TXU Corp., No. 3:03-CV-0888-P, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10945, at 
*13 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2005). 
57 See Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 282–83, 326.  
58 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–5, 27–8 (2002); 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-
Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 91 (2007); 
Dworkin, supra note 18, at 1773.  
59 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5567 
(2010). 
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a jury trial,60 precluding enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements,61 lengthening the statute of limitations,62 and broadening the 
class of covered employers.63 However, because of its even broader 
application and rewards, Dodd-Frank may eclipse the use of SOX in the 
future. 
B. The Reward Model 
1. The US FCA and Its Progeny 
The success of the revised FCA64 in recovering money for the 
government and for whistleblowers has led to a reward system dominating 
US whistleblower legislation today. The FCA was originally passed during 
the Civil War, when government procurement increased rapidly and the 
government did not have the resources to adequately monitor contractors or 
screen for quality.65 In order to deter fraudulent activities, Congress 
borrowed an idea from England and passed qui tam legislation designed to 
turn ordinary citizens into private attorneys-general to act on behalf of the 
government.66 If citizens discovered fraud involving government funds, 
whistleblowers called “relators,” were authorized to file a claim on behalf of 
                                                                                                                              
60 Id. § 922(c)(1)(B) amending 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
61 Id. § 922(c)(2). 
62 Id. § 922(c)(1)(A)(i). The limitations period is extended to 180 days (from ninety 
days) to file a complaint. Id. 
63 Id. § 929A. Expanding “covered employers” to include any “subsidiary or affiliate 
whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such 
company.” Id. Additionally, employees of “nationally-recognized statistical rating 
organizations” (generally assumed to be credit rating agencies, among others) are now 
covered. Id. § 922(b)(1). Dodd-Frank also amends the FCA to strengthen protections for 
whistleblowers.  
64 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988). 
65 For example, the government was sold sawdust as gunpowder. Callahan & Dworkin, 
Incentives, supra note 9, at 302 n.112. 
66 Id. at 302. 
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the government and they received a reward for their trouble.67 
The FCA was variously effective over the years, but a century later, for 
several reasons,68 it had fallen into disuse and only a handful of claims were 
being filed annually. Federal contract fraud continued to be a problem, and 
to address it, Congress significantly revised the FCA in 1986.69 Congress 
also instituted other reward provisions in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
regarding limited kinds of governmental wrongdoing,70 but the rewards 
were discretionary and the amounts were relatively small. It is the large 
rewards under the FCA that have become the primary characteristic of 
revised and new whistleblowing legislation. While all whistleblowing 
statutes still bar retaliation, FCA-style rewards have become the drivers of 
reports of wrongdoing by whistleblowers, and recovery of funds by the 
government.71 
Use of the FCA exploded after revision because of several beneficial 
changes, including increased certainty, size of rewards,72 and extension of 
the statute of limitations. Within three years, the number of claims increased 
                                                                                                                              
67 Id. Unlike most whistleblowing legislation, the relator does not need to be an 
employee. Id. However, most realtors gain their information by being an organizational 
member with reluctant access to insider information. See MARCIA P. MICELI ET AL., 
WHISTLE-BLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS 6, 34 (2008).  
68 Callahan & Dworkin, Whistleblower Protection, supra note 4, at 123 n.112. 
69 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (1988). 
70 See, e.g., Financial Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. § 
1831k (1990) (authorizing federal banking agencies to pay rewards for original 
information that leads to recoveries over $50 thousand); Insider Trading and Securities 
Enforcement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988) (authorizing the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to offer rewards of up to 10 percent of the penalty imposed for civil insider 
trading penalties). 
71 See MICELI, ET AL. supra note 67, at 164–65 (2008). 
72 Congress raised the possible recovery to treble the amount of the fraud and raised the 
possible fine per incident to $10,000 from $2,000, with thousands of claims possible in a 
single suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); see Fred Strasser, When the Big Whistle Blows . . . , 
NAT’L L. J., May 8, 1989, at 1, 43. 
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twenty-fold,73 and claims today are in the hundreds.74 The successful 
whistleblower gets up to 30 percent of the recovery of treble the fraud, plus 
the fines (which can be $10,000 per incident with the possibility that there 
may be hundreds of incidents in a suit). Since fraud in the health care and 
defense industries alone runs into the billions of dollars,75 the whistleblower 
almost always receives over a million dollars, and often much more.76 In 
fiscal year 2010, the government recouped $3 billion from civil cases alone 
in suits alleging fraud, an increase of 25 percent from the previous year.77 
Thus, the government and the whistleblower gain significantly from the 
FCA, as does, ultimately, the taxpayer. A recent study by the University of 
Chicago and Toronto University showed that in industries covered by the 
FCA, employees were substantially more likely to bring forth evidence of 
                                                                                                                              
73 Rick Wartzman & Paul M. Barrett, For Whistle-Blowers, Tune May Change, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 27, 1989, at 1. 
74 See Fraud Statistics – Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf. 
75 MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 164. An example of continuing large awards in the 
medical industry is illustrated by the October 2010 FCA claim settlement by 
GlaxcoSmithKline PLC for $750 million. Peter Loftus, Whistleblower’s Long Journey, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2010, at B1. The whistleblower received $96 million. Id. Graft 
from the Iraq war and reconstruction is a current source of lawsuits. See Joel Millman, 
The Hunt for Weapons of Mass Corruption, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2011, at A6. 
Encouraging off-label use of products by the manufacturers is an increasing source of 
such claims. Id. Two other cases of improper marketing in 2009 were settled for $2.3 
billion and $1.4 billion. Id.; see also Peter Loftus, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay 
$327 Million, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/  
S B10001424052702303745304576364621661093868.html. 
76 See, e.g., Warren P. Strobel & Marisa Taylor, $69.3 Million Afghan-Contracting Fine 
May Be a Record, MCCLATCHY (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/ 
05/103300/693-million-afghan-contracting.html#storylink=misearch; Andy Pasztor, 
Northrop Agrees to Pay $325 Million to Settle Suit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2009, at B1. 
However, when taxes and attorneys’ fees are paid, the net is less. Additionally, individual 
reward is diminished when cases involve multiple whistleblowers. 
77 Evan Perez, U.S. News: Lawsuits Bring in $3 Billion for U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 
2010, at A4. 
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major frauds than in those areas not covered.78 
 When large rewards first began to be issued, many questioned the ethics 
and propriety of such payments, as well as whether they would lead to 
meritless claims.79 The latter has been less problematic. There is little 
incentive to bring a meritless claim because the whistleblower can only 
recover if she or he bases the claim on information that the government 
does not have,80 and it leads to a recovery for the government. Additionally, 
it would be difficult to find a lawyer willing to represent the whistleblower 
if the information is unlikely to lead to a recovery, since many of these 
cases are taken on a contingency basis. The concern that whistleblowers 
might be motivated by gain rather than a desire to help is also no longer a 
major ethical consideration. The desire by the government to recover money 
and correct wrongdoing now trumps concerns regarding whistleblower 
motive. A “pure” motive is seen as secondary to the public good created by 
whistleblowers,81 regardless of motive.  
As the size of the reward is directly related to the magnitude of the fraud, 
it is proportional to the wrongdoer’s action, as well as beneficial to the 
government.82 The rewards are also seen as a way to stop wrongdoing, 
while also giving the whistleblower sufficient monetary protection for the 
risk of a lost job, lack of a future in the organization or even the profession, 
and other possible consequences of whistleblowing.83 A reasonable belief 
                                                                                                                              
78 Alexander Dyck, et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 
2215 (2010). 
79 See, e.g., Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 318–36; Elkan 
Abramowitz, Mutiny for the Bounty—Qui Tam: Bonanza or Fair Reward, N.Y.L.J., May 
1, 1990, at 3; Michael Waldman, Time to Blow the Whistle?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 25, 1991, 
at 13. 
80 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of the latest developments regarding the bar to basing a suit on previously 
disclosed information.  
81 See Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 319. 
82 Id. at 327. 
83 For a more thorough discussion of the issues, see id. at 318–36. 
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standard prevents rash claimants from profiting and can result in monetary 
costs to the meritless claimant.84 While the trend is now to limit the rewards 
to recoveries from significant wrongdoing, the question of propriety has 
been settled. 
State legislators, in a time of financial need, took notice of the success of 
the federal government’s recoveries and started passing their own FCA 
legislation.85 The state FCA statutes have proved to be as successful as the 
federal law in generating reports and recoveries.86 The range of statutory 
recovery allowed varies by state, with some more generous than the federal 
law.87 
More states were encouraged to pass targeted FCA-type legislation by the 
passage of the 2006 Deficit Reduction Act, which was enacted to help 
combat Medicaid fraud.88 The federal government pays 60 percent of 
Medicaid expenses, and the states shoulder 40 percent. This costs the 
federal government billions annually, and fraud is considered significant,89 
                                                                                                                              
84 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4). If a claim is clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought 
primarily for purposes of harassment, the judge can award the defendant reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.  
85 See MICELI, ET AL., supra note 67, Appendix. Before 1992, only three states provided 
for the possibility of a statutory reward, and the amounts were insignificant in relation to 
the retaliation suffered. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.530 (1991) (possible award of 
$50); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (25 percent of savings 
resulting from the whistleblowing in the first year, up to a limit of $2,000); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 230.83(2) (West 1987) (government can offer a reward for information to 
improve state administration or operations). 
86 See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, 177–81. It is recommended that states give the 
relator at least 15 percent of the state’s recovery. Id. at 166.  
87 Id. at 167. Nevada, for example, allows up to 50 percent of the recovery to go to the 
whistleblower. Id. at 165. 
88 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2005). The law also requires that 
health care providers provide education programs on fraud and how to file false claims 
complaints. Id. 
89 MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 166. 
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so Congress was particularly interested in encouraging whistleblowing.90 
States can recover even more than 40 percent of money recovered as a 
result of information received from a whistleblower if they enact laws that 
follow the federal reward model, and several have done so.91 
2. Tax Fraud 
A reward system for reporting tax cheats has long been in existence, but 
like the FCA before revisions, it was not very effective.92 As in the FCA, 
anyone with information about tax fraud could report and put a claim in for 
a reward.93 Rewards were at the discretion of the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) (which lost the reward amount from its revenue), and were seldom 
given or long-delayed.94 In an attempt to increase revenue, Congress urged 
the IRS to revise the policy to increase the incentives to report, noting that 
the gap between what was owed and actual tax payments was about $290 
billion annually.95 Several revisions similar to, but not as good as, the FCA 
were adopted in 2006.96 These revisions include giving whistleblowers 
more certain awards and information, and allowing them greater 
participation in the process. A whistleblower office within the agency was 
created.97 
Significantly, whistleblowers can now recover 15 to 30 percent of the 
                                                                                                                              
90 Jon Gibeaut, Seeking the Cure: With Health Care Fraud Rampant, States Are Urged 
to Pass Their Own False Claims Act, but Foes Warn of Windfalls for Plaintiffs Lawyers, 
92 OCT A.B.A. J. 44 (2006). 
91 MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 166, 177–81. 
92 Jean Eagleshaw & Ashby Jones, Whistleblower Bounties Pose Challenges, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 13, 2010, at C1 (quoting Dean Zerbe, Special Counsel at the National 
Whistleblower Center).  
93 See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 164. 
94 Id. 
95 Tom Herman, IRS Reworks Its Whistle-Blower Program; Tax Agency Is Criticized for 
Inconsistency in Paying Rewards, Lax Management, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at D1. 
96 Tax Relief and Health Care Act 2006, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
97 See 26 U.S.C. § 7623. The office is designed to receive and investigate complaints. Id. 
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proceeds from actions to recover more than $2 million, or from actions to 
recover from taxpayers with annual gross incomes of more than $200,000.98 
Similar to what happened after the FCA revisions, reporting of significant 
tax fraud increased after the revisions.99 Before, the IRS only received “a 
handful of legitimate claims” annually.100 In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the 
IRS received hundreds of reports of underpayments of $10 million, and 
dozens reporting underpayments of $100 million or more.101 In fiscal year 
2010, the IRS received 460 claims that appeared to meet the reward 
guidelines.102 
An intended advantage of the revisions was quicker payment of awards. 
However, speed in this context is relative. Despite the revisions in 2006, the 
first payout was not made until April 2011, and this happened only after the 
whistleblower hired an attorney to move his claim through the IRS.103 Four 
years after seeking recovery, he finally received an award of $4.5 million.104 
The award was widely reported, and it was hoped that raised awareness 
                                                                                                                              
98 Id. The amount awarded depends on “the extent to which the individual substantially 
contributed to such action.” Id. “This law is not designed to snag the guppies, but to 
harpoon the whales.” MaryClaire Dale, Associated Press, IRS Awards $4.5M to 
Whistleblower, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/ 
taxes/2011-04-08-irs-whistleblower-taxes-reward.htm (quoting Patrick Burns of the 
nonprofit Taxpayers Against Fraud). 
99 Herman, supra note 95, at D3. 
100 Eagleshaw & Jones, supra note 92. 
101 MaryClaire Dale, Associated Press, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal’: IRS Awards $4.5 Million, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal’]. 
102 Ashby Jones, Accountant Gets Whistleblower Payout, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576250870321773348.html. 
The IRS received 5,678 tips during this period. Id. A large number of the tips involve ex-
spouses or mom-and-pop businesses. Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal,’ supra note 101. 
103 Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal,’ supra note 101, at A1. The whistleblower, an 
accountant, discovered that his employer, a Fortune 500 company, had a tax liability of 
over $20 million and reported it to the employer. Id. When the company refused to report 
it to the IRS, he gave the agency the information. Id. 
104 Id. The IRS withheld taxes before sending the check, so he actually received $3.24 
million. Id. 
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would further increase reporting.105 Subsequently, the IRS adopted a new 
policy that it will not pay awards until the two-year period for taxpayers to 
appeal their payments has expired.106 The slowness in payment may well 
make it more difficult for whistleblowers to find an attorney to represent 
them and reduce their willingness to report.107 
3. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
Dodd-Frank was passed after the financial crisis of 2008.108 After the 
financial crisis, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) used the 
bounty structures and experiences of the IRS, the FCA successes, and the 
SOX experiences to benchmark its past performance under its limited 
bounty program and make recommendations regarding its expanded role in 
encouraging whistleblowing under Dodd-Frank.109 Although rulemaking 
under the new law is ongoing, the reward structure is in place, and analysis 
and predictions based on the IRS and FCA history is possible.110 
                                                                                                                              
105 Id. “It ought to encourage a lot of other people to squeal.” (quoting Senator Charles 
Grassley, who helped get the IRS whistleblower office authorized in 2006). Id. However, 
the delay in recovery may also have a negative impact. Id. There have been several 
criticisms, explanations, and excuses offered about the delay. Id. Senator Grassley said 
the delay may be due, in part, to the fact that the IRS may fear embarrassment for missing  
$20 million underpayments. Id. The IRS said a routine audit was already under way in 
the case, but the accountant’s information pointed out a new question. Id. The Treasury 
Department’s Inspector General for Tax Administration found that the Agency suffered 
from “deficiencies” in the “control and timely resolution of whistleblower claims.” 
Eagleshaw & Jones, supra note 92, at C1. 
106 Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal,’ supra note 101. 
107 See Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 315–16. 
108 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 
(2010)). 
109 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM iii 
(Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2010/ 
474.pdf. It also benchmarked against the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Id. 
110 Yin Wilczek, Final Whistleblower Program Will Mirror SEC Proposal; Will Be Hurt 
by Budget Needs, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 102 (2011). It should be noted that in addition 
to conflict created by the lobbying on behalf of business interests versus employee and 
whistleblower advocates about the rules and regulations, there is conflict between 
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Another spur to Dodd-Frank and its reward structure was the failure of 
the SEC to act on a multi-billion dollar fraud case, reported to it over 
several years.111 New York money manager Bernard Madoff ran a Ponzi 
scheme112 that lasted for decades.113 The fallout from this scheme was 
“massive and . . . rocked Wall Street,”114 which was already suffering from 
the financial crisis.115 After the Madoff affair was revealed, several more 
Ponzi schemes came to light, but none had as significant an impact.116 The 
                                                                                                                              
Republicans and Democrats regarding this law. Id. There is a “stark divide” between the 
views of corporations and whistleblowers, and that is reflected in Congress itself “where 
there are fairly wide gaps between liberals and conservatives.” Id. (quoting Lawrence 
West, former associate director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division and now a partner in 
Latham & Watkins LLC). 
111 Kara Scannell et al., Crisis on Wall Street: Markopolos Testifies Fairfield Knew Little 
About Madoff, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at C2. The whistleblower, Harry Markopolos, 
persistently went to the SEC with information, and even offered to conduct an undercover 
operation for the agency, but he was rebuffed. Id. Madoff was convicted in the criminal 
case against him and is in prison for life. See James Heller & Joanna Chung, Life After 
Madoff’s ‘Big Lie’, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11–2, 2010, at A1. 
112 Dionne Searcey, Post-Madoff, a Support Network: Victims of Alleged Ponzi Scheme 
Find Comfort Through Shared Hardship, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2009, at C3. It is the 
biggest Ponzi scheme in history involving at least $50 billion. Id. Investors in the scheme 
may number in the thousands. Marcy Gordon, Associated Press, SEC, Madoff to Settle 
Civil Suit, SEATTLE P-I, Feb. 10, 2009, at C7. 
113 Gordon, supra note 112. It officially came to light in December 2008, when Madoff’s 
sons turned him in a day after he confessed to them. Id. 
114 Id. The fallout continues three years later. See, e.g., Chad Bray & Michael Rothfield, 
The Madoff Fraud: Peter Madoff Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2012, at B1 
(stating that Peter Madoff, brother of Bernard Madoff, submitted his guilty plea three 
years to the day after his brother was sentenced to 150 years in prison); Chad Bray, 
Money Manager Settles Madoff-Related Case, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2012, at C1; Chad 
Bray, The Madoff Fraud: Sixth Guilty Plea in Scheme, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2011, at C3. 
It has had victims worldwide, and there are battles over reclaiming funds and 
compensating victims. See Reed Albergotti, The Madoff Fraud: Amid Battles, Trustee 
Seeks $2 Billion Payout, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2012, at C1. 
115 Michael Rothfeld, Madoff Claims Lure Banks, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2011, at 
A1.There are numerous lawsuits against different entities from Madoff’s victims and the 
court appointed trustee who is trying to reclaim funds for the victims. Id. “[S]orting out 
the huge Madoff fraud claims has become a mini-industry . . . .” Id. 
116 Steve Stecklow, In Echoes of Madoff, Ponzi Cases Proliferate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 
2009, at A1; Yuka Hayashi, Japan Police Target Alleged Ponzi Scheme, WALL ST. J., 
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Madoff whistleblower that attempted to alert the SEC called the agency 
“both a captive regulator and a failed regulator,” and some of the 
congresspersons on the committee investigating the SEC’s failure agreed.117 
The Madoff whistleblower recommended that the SEC set up a unit to 
receive tips in a manner similar to the unit implemented by the IRS.118 In 
light of the failure of SOX, the government decided that increased oversight 
and regulation was necessary,119 and that rewards would play a role in 
inducing whistleblowing and better protecting the whistleblower.120 
Dodd-Frank is broader than SOX in terms of what types of 
whistleblowing will be protected,121 who is protected,122 and the types of 
                                                                                                                              
Feb. 6, 2009, at A6. Following these, an alleged $8 billion fraud scheme run by Allen 
Stanford was revealed due to closer inspection because of the Madoff fraud. Glenn R. 
Simpson et al., The Stanford Affair: Madoff Case Led SEC to Intensify Stanford Probe, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A14. Like Madoff, allegations had “dogged R. Allen 
Stanford” for years, but the agencies failed to act effectively. Id. One accused Ponziist, 
Guy Albert de Chimay, built trust with his clients by claiming he managed $200 million 
(false) for his royal relatives (true) in Belgium. Michael Rothfeld, Famous Name Is 
Charged, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2010, at B1. He allegedly defrauded them of $7 million. 
Id. Kenneth Starr, a financial advisor who allegedly defrauded clients out of $59 million, 
pleaded guilty in September 2010, to securities fraud among many other counts. Chad 
Bray, Investment Advisor to Stars Kenneth Starr Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 
2010, at B1. 
117 Gregory Zuckerman & David Gauthier-Villars, The Madoff Fraud Case: A Lonely 
Lament From a Whistle-Blower, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at C3. He also said that he 
did not press his charges even harder because he feared retribution from the powerful 
Madoff. Id. Others who questioned Madoff’s performance numbers failed to come 
forward at all. Aaron Lucchetti, The Madoff Fraud Case: On Street, Reluctance to Blow 
the Whistle, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2009, at C4. 
118 Zuckerman & Gauthier-Villars, supra note 117. . 
119 Obama Lists Key Principles for Reform Of Nation’s Financial Regulatory System, 77 
U.S.L.W. 2517 (2009). “To rebuild trust in our markets, we must redouble our efforts to 
promote openness, transparency and plain language throughout our financial system.” Id.; 
Elizabeth Williamson & Melanie Trottman, The Obama Budget: Federal Workers, 
Regulations to Increase, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2009, at A4; Damian Paletta, Bernanke 
Calls for Broader Regulations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A4. 
120 Deborah L. Cohen, Wetting Their Whistles, 97-MAR A.B.A. J. 14 (2011). 
121 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 
(2010). One court has held that included within the protection is an internal complaint 
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protection.123 Like all whistleblowing laws, retaliation is barred.124 
Importantly, it contains a reward provision to encourage whistleblowers to 
report financial wrongdoing of those involved in transactions in public 
markets.125 Similar to the FCA, a whistleblower that comes forward with 
new information about wrongdoing may receive 10 to 30 percent126 of what 
the government recovers from civil or criminal actions, with a jurisdictional 
limitation that recovery must yield $1 million or more.127 This limit is 
                                                                                                                              
about a violation. Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 
1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
122 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. § 
5567 (2010). The law protects whistleblowing employees of organizations and people 
that provide financial services to consumers. Id. § 5567(b). This is expansively defined. 
Id. The coverage can be expanded by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Id. § 
5492(a)(1). 
123 Id. § 5567(c). The whistleblower must submit a charge to the Department of Labor 
(DOL) within 180 days of the alleged retaliation. Id. § 5567(c)(1)(A). If the DOL finds 
probable cause, it must order preliminary relief. Id. § 5567(c)(2)(B). This can include 
reinstatement and back pay. Id. § 5567(c)(4)(B). Included in an award can be 
“compensatory damages,” but this is undefined. Id. Either party can seek review of the 
Secretary of Labor’s order in the Circuit Court of Appeals in the district where the 
whistleblower lived at the time of the alleged violation. Id. § 5567(c)(4)(E). 
Whistleblowers can report anonymously if represented by counsel, but must reveal their 
identity before collecting the award. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010). 
124 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h). Retaliation is broadly defined. Id. 
125 Id. § 78u-6. The section amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78a et seq.), creating the new § 21E. Id. § 78u-6(a). The entities include investment banks 
and broker-dealers as well as public companies. Id. Generally, claims must be brought 
within six years of the date of the violation. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii). 
126 Id. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)(B). The amount of the award is at the discretion of the 
Commission considering the significance of the information to the success of the 
recovery, the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower or his or her legal 
representative, the “programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring violations of 
the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers,” and “such additional relevant 
factors” the Commission may establish by rule or regulation. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(III). 
Specifically excluded from being considered by the Commission is the balance of the 
Fund. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
Id. § 78u-6(a)(1). The news media is specifically mentioned a source that the 
whistleblower cannot exclusively rely on. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(C). The information must be 
voluntarily provided. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).  
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similar to that imposed by the IRS, but unlike the FCA, which has no 
amount jurisdictional limit. 
Several additional limitations exist on recovery, however. In order to 
collect, the information provided by the whistleblower must be based on 
information not already known to the SEC or taken exclusively from public 
sources.128 Specifically excluded from recovering are members, officers, or 
employees of “an appropriate regulatory agency,” the Department of 
Justice, a self-regulatory organization, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, or a law enforcement organization.129 Additionally, a 
whistleblower that is convicted of a criminal violation related to judicial or 
administrative action cannot recover, unlike in the FCA, which allows for 
possible recovery.130 And unlike the IRS auditor-whistleblower scenario 
discussed above, a whistleblower gaining information through an audit of 
financial statements required under securities laws is limited in recovery.131 
Finally, a whistleblower that fails to submit information in the form 
required by the SEC cannot collect.132 
As these limitations illustrate, one of the trends in the evolution of federal 
whistleblower reward laws is to circumscribe who can recover and how 
rewards can be obtained.133 In part, this trend is due to significant lobbying 
by business interests.134 It was reflected in the effort to add more limitations 
                                                                                                                              
128 Id. § 78u-6(a)(3). In an important change from previous whistleblower laws, original 
information can be based on a whistleblower’s original analysis, not just evidence of 
wrongdoing. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(A). 
129 Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(A)(i-v). 
130 Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B). 
131 Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C). The auditor cannot recover if submission of the information 
would violate the requirements of § 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. 
132 Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D). 
133 Gregory F. Parisi, A World of Whistleblowers: What Companies Should Know About 
Dealing with Third Parties Going Forward, 80 U.S.L.W. 863 (2012). However, unlike 
other laws, the eligibility for an award has global application. Id. 
134 See, e.g., Jessica Holzer, SEC Urged to Revise ‘Whistleblower’ Plan, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 17, 2011, at C2. More than 260 firms told the SEC that the reward plan would turn 
financial fraud into a gold mine for employees. Jean Eagleshaw, Firms Assail 
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through restrictive rules and regulations,135 and efforts to block President 
Obama for an extended period from appointing the head of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau.136 Despite the lobbying against the reward 
system and Republican threats to cut funding, the SEC, in a three-two vote 
on May 25, 2011, passed a rule giving employees the right to report 
wrongdoing directly to the SEC without first reporting to a company’s 
compliance program.137 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said the rule was 
intended to “break the silence of those who see a wrong.”138 It is also seen 
as a tool to help deter wrongdoing.139 The rule was revised, though, so that 
if employees report internally (as most employees do) and the company 
informs the SEC about the violation, the employees can still get an award, 
as they could if they report internally and then to the SEC within 120 
                                                                                                                              
Whistleblowers Plan by SEC, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010; Eagleshaw & Jones, supra 
note 92, at C1. The Dodd-Frank law is so broad that is has already produced more than 
three million words in the Federal Register, and about 62 percent of the 387 sets of rules 
hadn’t been proposed as of the end of April 2011. Jean Eagleshaw, Overhaul Grows and 
Slows, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2011, at C1. Indeed, no agency met any of the 26 Dodd-
Frank-related April deadlines. Id. 
135 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 120, at 14–15; Wilczek, supra note 110; Eagleshaw & 
Jones, supra note 92; Deborah Solomon & Jamila Trindle, New Financial Rules Delayed, 
WALL ST. J., June 15, 2011, at A1. This applies mainly to rule about derivatives. Id.  
136 Deborah Solomon, Consumer Agency Stymied by GOP, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704810504576305553238068870.html. 
The Republicans want the agency restructured before they will approve an appointment. 
Id. Many business groups oppose the agency. Id. The lobbying about Dodd-Frank 
continues. See Jessica Holzer & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Addressing Gaps in Analysis, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/  
SB10001424052702304818404577348101006567024.html.  
137 Allen Smith, SEC Approves Final Whistle-Blowing Rule, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. 
MGMT, http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues/FederalResources/Pages/  
SECWhistleBlowing Rule.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
138 David Hilzenrath, SEC Rule Rewards Those Who Detect Fraud, SEATTLE TIMES, May 
26, 2011, at A14 (quoting the Washington Post). The vote was split along party lines with 
Democrats voting for the rule. Id. 
139 Id. 
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days.140 
The Dodd-Frank reward structure is seen as a bellwether for the other 
rules and regulations that will follow,141 notwithstanding the fears that a 
lack of resources142 and other limits could hamper its effectiveness, as was 
the case with SOX, OSHA, and the IRS.143 As what happened with the FCA 
and IRS revised reward laws, Dodd-Frank has generated a large number of 
claims. Claims began to come in before the law was passed in July 2010, 
and the SEC forecast at that time it would receive thirty thousand tips a 
year.144 The SEC said it has already received hundreds of tips because of the 
law,145 and many of them are “high quality.”146 
Dodd-Frank also created a similar reward system under the Commodity 
Exchange Act.147 The rewards are for information provided to Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). As with the Madoff scandal, the 
CFTC recently failed to detect significant fraud before the financial crisis, 
                                                                                                                              
140 Smith, supra note 137. Internal reporting could also increase the amount of the award 
the whistleblower receives. Id. 
141 Hilzenrath, supra note 138. 
142 Wilczek, supra note 110. Since the Republicans are in control of the House, getting 
sufficient resources could be a struggle. Id. The enforcement program was allegedly 
underfunded for many years prior to Dodd-Frank. Id. The law called for an increase of 18 
percent to the SEC’s budget. Id. In April, a deal was reached to provide adequate funding 
through September 2011. Suzanne Barlyn, SEC, CFTC Win Increases in Funding in 
Budget Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/  
SB10001 424052748703518704576258840642909826.html. What happens next depends 
in part on the election results of 2012. 
143 Eagleshaw & Jones, supra note 92, at C1. 
144 Id. 
145 See Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge in Fraud Tips, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C3; Wilczek, supra note 110. A plaintiff’s firm said calls 
from potential whistleblowers had gone up tenfold. Id. It also said that they had “been 
judicious” about passing information to the SEC because they wanted to review them and 
make sure the SEC was going to take them seriously. Id. 
146 Hilzenrath, supra note 138, at A16 (quoting Robert Khuzami, an SEC enforcement 
official). 
147 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 
(2010). 
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despite agency examinations.148 
C. The Structural Dimension 
As already noted, a variety of US provisions are not limited simply to 
anti-retaliation measures and reward mechanisms, but have progressively 
included elements of a “structural” or institutional model of whistleblowing 
legislation.149 The broad intention is to require or induce the establishment 
of institutional mechanisms by which organizations take it on themselves to 
encourage internal whistleblowing, prevent and control wrongdoing, and 
prevent or self-remedy retaliation. Some structural reforms included 
establishment of independent mechanisms for disclosure, such as the OSC; 
however, SOX reflected a significant shift towards organizational 
requirements compared to previous legislation. 
In another attempt, Congress tried to get private corporations to set up a 
structural model under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.150 Taking 
a carrot and stick approach, the Organizational Sentencing Guidlines stated 
that if an organization adopted an effective program to detect and deter 
violations of law, penalties could be reduced (up to 95 percent) if the 
organization was convicted of a crime.151 Conversely, penalties could be 
increased (up to 400 percent) if the organization had no such program.152 
                                                                                                                              
148 Silla Brush, Regulator Twice Failed to Find Fraud at Peregrine, SEATTLE TIMES, July 
12, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2018709101_peregrine18. 
html?syndication=rss. The investigations were made in 2007 and 2008. Id. A third was 
scheduled in 2011, but didn’t take place due to lack of resources of the CFTC. Id. The 
fraud caused the collapse of Peregrine Financial Group and a shortfall of $200 million in 
client funds. Id. 
149 Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8. 
150 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 (1991), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/1991_guidelines/Manual_PDF/1991_Guidelines_ 
Manual_Full.pdf. 
151 See Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8, at 1134; Dworkin, supra note 
18, at 1775. 
152 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 150. 
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An effective program included a code of ethics and a whistleblowing 
procedure that banned retaliation, and was known to employees and 
prosecuted effectively.153 
A more recent development involving a structural element is found in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed by President Obama on 
March 23, 2010, which expands the effort to reduce fraud and recover funds 
in the health care area.154 In addition to reward provisions, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act includes a requirement that long-term 
care facilities tell their employees that they are required to report reasonable 
suspicion that a crime is occurring, or has occurred, and that if they fail to 
do so they are subject to a fine of up to $200,000. 
In the absence of reward mechanisms, US experience has been that these 
efforts to embed whistleblowing structurally or institutionally have had 
limited effect in spurring whistleblowing or protecting whistleblowers. 
They have also not prevented crises such as those brought on by Enron, 
WorldCom, the Madoff fraud, or the current financial crisis. Nevertheless, 
the adoption of a structural model has been relatively piecemeal. This raises 
the question whether the approach will nevertheless continue to develop, 
and involve—by accident or design—some movement towards a greater 
blending of models. 
D. Whistleblowing and the Media 
By contrast with any of the three preceding approaches, one model, 
embraced by neither federal nor state laws, involves significant attention to 
protecting whistleblowing to the media.155 This is in some respects 
surprising, given that whistleblowing to the media has long provided a 
                                                                                                                              
153 See Dworkin, supra note 18, at 1771. 
154 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
155 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to 
the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 151 (1994). 
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quintessential example of whistleblowing.156 Among researchers, there has 
been debate about whether disclosures that do not reach the public domain 
should be categorized as whistleblowing at all.157 
Why has this been a silent or missing element in the United States? A 
partial explanation lies in the fact that public employees have some 
constitutional protection for whistleblowing under the First Amendment. 
The 1978 CSRA legislation also sought to buttress these First Amendment 
rights of freedom of speech.158 However, provisions once aimed at this 
result have proved over time to be of limited benefit. One example is the 
1989 WPA extension of protection to disclosures outside official channels 
“not specifically prohibited by law . . . if such information is not 
specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.”159 
In 2006, the First Amendment protection was also significantly 
undermined by the Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.160 In 
this case, a prosecutor wrote a memo asking whether a sheriff’s deputy had 
lied in an affidavit to get a search warrant.161 The Court found that when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens, and, thus, are not constitutionally 
protected from employer sanctions. This was seen as potentially silencing 
public employee whistleblowing.162 Attempts to amend the WPA163 and 
                                                                                                                              
156 The Pentagon Papers and the Watergate scandals are examples. 
157 See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 7–10, 85. 
158 ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 88–
107, 286–308 (2013). 
159 Whistleblower Protection Act 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1)(B) (2002). 
160 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
161 Id. at 413–16. 
162 MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 155. Senators picked up on the Garcetti dissent’s idea 
that the majority’s decision could silence whistleblowers and unanimously passed 
legislation to overturn it. Id. at 155–56 (Sen. Bill S. 494). The House passed similar 
legislation, but the differences between the bills were not resolved in the conference 
committee. See id. at 156–57. 
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provide broader coverage have been unsuccessful.164 
In the private sector, legislation does not protect whistleblowing to the 
media, and a recent decision showed that courts are also disinclined to 
protect this sort of whistleblowing. In Tides v. Boeing Co.,165 the court 
rejected the whistleblower’s argument that protection should be given 
because whistleblowing to the media might lead to information being 
provided to one of the recipients authorized by SOX.166 If the whistleblower 
first reports to the media, she or he must then file a claim under the FCA or 
Dodd-Frank in order to gain the statutory benefits.167 This disinclination to 
extend protection to media whistleblowers seems based on the perception 
that whistleblowers go to the media because their claims are “less worthy” 
or groundless, or because they are seeking revenge or are compelled by 
other bad motives.168 However, studies paint a different picture.169 Most 
media whistleblowers turn to the media because they lack power within the 
organization to effect change, there is a high risk of retaliation, or they seek 
anonymity. Additionally, a lack of meaningful response when the 
wrongdoing was reported within the organization prompts this drive toward 
the media.170 
If the whistleblower chooses to go outside the organization to report, the 
                                                                                                                              
163 Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a) (2002).  
164 See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 155–56. 
165 Tides v. Boeing Co., 644 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2011); see also, Terry Morehead Dworkin 
& Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the Media: When Is a “Source” A 
“Sourcerer”?, 15 COMM/ENT L. J. 357, 361 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin & Callahan, 
Employee Disclosures].  
166 Dworkin & Callahan, Employee Disclosures, supra note 165, at 816–17.  
167 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2010). The person must be the original 
source of the information to the media. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii). 
168 Dworkin & Callahan, Employee Disclosures, supra note 165; Sissela Bok, 
Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. EDUC. Q. 1, 4 (1980). [T]he 
disappointed, the incompetent, the malicious, and the paranoid all too often leap to 
accusations in public . . . .” Id. 
169 Dworkin & Callahan, Employee Disclosures, supra note 165, at 392. 
170 Id. at 394. 
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government and the media are the two primary external outlets. Each group 
has a different focus, however. The government is charged with serving the 
public interest, while the media is more influenced by economic pressures 
of competition, especially in the “Internet Age”; newsworthiness is not 
necessarily a measure of the public good.171 Additionally, government 
entities often want to capture the information themselves and mandate 
disclosure to particular persons, agencies, or other entities if the 
whistleblower is to be protected.172 
In the United States, the focus of whistleblowing laws has shifted 
primarily from protection against retaliation to significant rewards for 
information. This change has also been marked by a limited focus on 
structural models of protection and little attention given to the role of the 
media. It remains to be seen how effective the Dodd-Frank law and the 
mechanisms created to enforce it will be, but so far, it is the reward model 
that has most closely achieved the desired results. This contrasts with the 
progression in Australian law, which began similarly in terms of an anti-
retaliation focus, but has relied more heavily on detailed structural models, 
and has most recently turned towards enhancement of the role of the media, 
while eschewing rewards entirely. 
III. THE MEDIA? WHISTLEBLOWING LAW REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 
A. Anti-Retaliation 
As in the United States, much of the initial Australian movement towards 
statutory recognition of whistleblowing lay in assumptions that fear of 
reprisal represented the primary disincentive to employee disclosure of 
wrongdoing. In 1990, in the state of Queensland, the first temporary 
                                                                                                                              
171 Id. at 393. There is usually a direct relationship between newsworthiness and the 
significance of the wrongdoing. Id. 
172 Id. at 368. 
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whistleblowing legislation was built on removal of official or legal 
retaliation (“authorized” reprisals), criminalization of retaliation, and 
injunctive relief.173 Soon, a range of Australian state jurisdictions followed 
suit with whistleblowing laws covering, for the most part, public-sector 
wrongdoing revealed by public-sector employees.174 
Much of the aim was to remove official legal barriers to disclosure, 
outlaw retaliation, and provide criminal and civil remedies if retaliation 
occurred. Civil remedies are based on the creation of a tort of victimization, 
which provides a right to sue for damages for detrimental action in the 
general courts.175 The only state not to have provided this remedy, New 
South Wales (NSW), finally did so in 2010.176 In addition to this remedy, 
over time, three states have provided an alternative right to seek restitution 
or damages for victimization through anti-discrimination tribunals, whose 
role otherwise includes complaints in respect to detrimental action taken on 
the basis of gender, racial, or other discrimination.177 
The limits of these remedial avenues are immediately clear, even by 
comparison with US provisions. Even the most recent addition, in NSW, 
                                                                                                                              
173 See Whistleblowers (Interim Protection) and Miscellaneous Amendments Act 1990 
(Qld) (Austl.); Brown, Sunshine, supra note 6. 
174 See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Act 
2002 (Tas) (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 (Vic) (Austl.); Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) (Austl.); Protected Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) (Austl.); 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 
(SA) (Austl.). 
175 See, e.g., Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 9(2)(a) (Austl.); see also Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT) s 41 (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 
(Qld) s 43(1) (Austl.) (current version at Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) ss 42-
43 (Austl.)); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) 15(1) (Austl.); Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 2002 (Tas) s 20(2) (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 (Vic) s 
19(1) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) s 29 (Austl.). 
176 See Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) s 24 (Austl.) (current version at Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) s 20(A) (Austl.)). 
177 See Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 45(1)(c) (Austl.) (current version at 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 44 (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 
1993 (SA) s 9(2)(b) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) s 15(4) (Austl.). 
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explicitly provides that recoverable civil damages “do not include 
exemplary or punitive damages or damages in the nature of aggravated 
damages.”178 General problems of cost and risk of adverse outcomes mean 
there have never been more than a handful of claims.179 There are also no 
legal firms or services with any significant, specialized experience in such 
actions. 
Also, the courts have sometimes had difficulty in identifying how these 
compensation avenues compare to, or fit with, other compensation rights—
such as those granted under workplace health and safety legislation—as 
well as how they can co-exist with the criminal offence of reprisal.180 
Indeed, the poor configuration of anti-retaliation rights in state legislation is 
replete with ironies. One Queensland court effectively decided that no 
action for civil damages could be taken unless the criminal offence of 
reprisal had first been proven or could at least be shown to have occurred, 
effectively reducing the damages provision to a criminal victim’s 
compensation provision.181 
Legislative reform to reverse the effect of these and other decisions182 
may represent a fairly small “band aid” on the larger problems involved. 
These reforms reflect the general problem that strong focus on the 
criminalization of reprisals—intended to be a strength of Australian anti-
retaliation approaches—has proven to be more symbolic than substantive. 
Very few prosecutions for reprisal have been undertaken and there have 
been no known successes.183 While reprisal offences may help encourage 
                                                                                                                              
178 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) s 20(A)(3) (Austl.). 
179 See A.J. Brown et al., Best Practice Whistleblowing Legislation for the Public Sector: 
Key Principles, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
ORGANISATIONS 261, 271–77 (2008) (discussing the few known claims). 
180 See id. 
181 See Howard v Queensland [2000] Qd R 223 (Austl.); Brown et al., supra note 179. 
182 See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 42(5) (Austl.). 
183 Brown et al., supra note 179. 
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whistleblowing and deter reprisals, in practice they may have made real 
whistleblower protection more difficult by distracting from, or masking, the 
reality that the vast bulk of adverse outcomes unjustly suffered by 
whistleblowers are never likely to be proven to a criminal standard.184 
Further irony is found in the possibility that the statutory tort of 
victimization, as presently configured, may close off, or restrict, other more 
generous rights under the general law of employment. For example, one of 
the few significant compensation awards was in favor of a NSW police 
officer whose employer failed to sufficiently support him after he reported 
and gave evidence of suspected internal misconduct.185 The claim was 
brought under common law principles of employment, rather than under 
any whistleblowing remedy, which in NSW may now have restricted rather 
than amplified the chances of such outcomes. 
Other cases similarly suggest that, at best, the civil compensation 
provisions offer little practical benefit to aggrieved whistleblowers. They 
exist in parallel to existing rights of compensation for work-based injury, 
which, while ill-matched to whistleblowing situations, are at least a more 
recognizable part of the legal landscape.186 For example, the confidential 
settlement achieved in 2012 by one of Australia’s most prominent 
whistleblowers, nursing manager Toni Hoffman, was achieved in response 
to a claim under the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 
(Qld). The national and international media profile of the case was 
undoubtedly of greater assistance to this settlement than were the relevant 
                                                                                                                              
184 See Rodney Smith & A.J. Brown, The Good, The Bad and the Ugly: Whistleblowing 
Outcomes, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
ORGANISATIONS, 129–30, 134 (2008). 
185 See Wheadon v New South Wales (Unreported, District Court of NSW, Feb. 2, 2001) 
(Austl.) (ordering the NSW Police Service to pay AUD$664,270 for having breached its 
duty of care to the officer, who experienced harassment and victimization resulting in 
serious stress culminating in psychiatric illness). 
186 Brown et al., supra note 179. 
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whistleblowing anti-retaliation provisions.187 
It is unlikely that the irrelevance of such provisions is because 
whistleblowers are undeserving of compensation. Recent empirical research 
into public sector whistleblowing, encapsulating 118 federal, state, and 
local agencies, confirms that the need exists for more effective, realistic, 
targeted, and low-cost compensation mechanisms.188 Although not all 
whistleblowers claim to suffer mistreatment or retaliation, significant 
proportions do, directly or indirectly.189 The risks of mistreatment quickly 
escalate if public employees report wrongdoing that is more widespread or 
systemic, particularly involving more senior employees.190 The experience 
of whistleblowers is generally corroborated by evidence from managers and 
case handlers.191 Yet outside normal misconduct investigation channels, 
Australia’s state whistleblowing regimes do not offer even an intermediate 
administrative path to remedies for retaliation or mismanagement, like those 
offered under some US regimes (successful or otherwise). The closest 
                                                                                                                              
187 See Toni Hoffman Settles Claim for Compensation, MAURICE BLACKBURN LAWYERS 
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.mauriceblackburn.com.au/news/press-releases—  
announcements/2012/toni-hoffman-settles-claim-for-compensation.aspx. The original 
claim was for AUD$400,000 for medical expenses, loss of income and superannuation 
and stress arising mostly from the wrongdoing and investigation processes, including lack 
of support, as well as loss of future earnings due to the general impact on her career. See 
Dr Jayant Patel Nurse Toni Hoffman and Queensland Health Settle Claim, 
COURIERMAIL.COM.AU (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/  
queensland/patel-nurse-queensland-health-settle-claim/story-e6freoof-1226294131009. 
Alleged direct reprisals or retaliation were limited to vilification and ostracism by local 
managers, since dismissed or disciplined. Ms. Hoffman remains employed by 
Queensland Health. See Hoffman v Queensland (Unreported, Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 2011) 
(Austl.). For an overall account of the “Dr. Death” case involving serial criminal medical 
negligence resulting in death, see HEDLEY THOMAS, SICK TO DEATH (2007). 
188 See Brown et al., supra note 179, at 109–60, 203–32, 261–88. 
189 See Smith & Brown, supra note 184, at 127–29, 134.  
190 See A.J. Brown & Jane Olsen, Whistleblower Mistreatment: Identifying the Risks, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 
(2008). 
191 See Smith & Brown, supra note 184, at 127–29, 134. 
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equivalents are the anti-discrimination remedies noted earlier, but again, 
there is little sign that these are proving accessible or successful. Statistics 
on the tiny number of cases handled recently by the most established anti-
discrimination regime—South Australia—suggest otherwise.192 
Until recently, the stagnation of Australian anti-retaliation provisions, 
notwithstanding recent and current law reform efforts in the public sector, 
has been reinforced by the state of policy at the federal level. In contrast to 
state efforts, no federal public-sector whistleblowing legislation exists, 
despite recommendations for such legislation since the early 1990s.193 A 
new Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) included a provision prohibiting 
victimization against many federal servants if they reported misconduct, but 
without any separate enforceable remedies. More recently, political shifts 
and a fresh parliamentary inquiry194 led to two federal public interest 
disclosure bills covering public sector wrongdoing, including the first ever 
                                                                                                                              
192 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2007-08 17 (2008), available at 
http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/files/attachments/annual_report_2008.pdf 
(finding one complaint lodged); see also EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2008-09 18 (2009), available at http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/ 
files/attachments/annual_report_2009.pdf (finding eight complaints but none found to be 
within the Act); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2009-10 39–41 
(2010), available at http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/files/attachments/2009-
10_annual_report_print.pdf (finding eight complaints with one found to be within to be 
within the Act); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2010-11 21 (2011), 
available at http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/files/attachments/2010-11_ 
annual_report.pdf (finding that five complaints, three within the Act, one conciliated, two 
may proceed to tribunal hearing); cf. Smith & Brown, supra note 184 (stating statistical 
evidence that the number of state government employees deserving of reportable 
remedies for mistreatment in public interest reporting cases are more likely to number in 
the hundreds (perhaps 500–700) per year, based on data from other jurisdictions). For 
concerns about the adequacy of the provisions from the start, see SENATE SELECT 
COMM., supra note 7, at ¶ 4.48-4.51.  
193 See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7. 
194 See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL 
AFFAIRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME FOR THE 
COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SECTOR (1999) (Cth) (Austl.), available at 
http://fraud.govspace.gov.au/files/2010/12/Whistleblower-protection-House-of-
Representatives.pdf [hereinafter STANDING COMM.]. 
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government bill.195 These are before the federal parliament at the time of 
writing. The issue of effective remedies proved one of the most 
problematic. The parliamentary committee’s primary suggestion—that an 
enforceable compensation mechanism for federal employees be embedded 
in the new federal Fair Work Act then under design—was initially rejected 
by the federal government without clarity as to what alternative anti-
retaliation mechanism would be available.196 
Similarly, anti-retaliation measures in the only national private sector 
whistleblowing legislation, Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), are severely limited. Despite recommendations dating from 1994, it 
took until 2004 for these measures to be introduced as part of corporate 
transparency reforms that paralleled SOX.197 Far from being 
comprehensive, however, the provisions relate only to reported breaches of 
corporations legislation and no other regulation.198 Additionally, they 
provide only ill-defined rights of reinstatement in the event of dismissal or 
compensation in the event that a criminal offence of victimization is 
proven.199 These provisions provide nothing in between, nor any 
mechanisms for administrative relief or independent investigation of 
                                                                                                                              
195 The first was a private member’s bill introduced by Independent MP Andrew Wilkie 
in October 2012. See Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Bill 2012 
(Cth) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2012 (Cth) (Austl.).  The government bill was introduced in March 
2013.  See Public Interest Disclosure Bill 2013 (Cth) (Austl.). 
196 See id. at 104; cf. Government Response: Whistleblower Protection: A Comprehensive 
Scheme for the Commonwealth Public Sector, (2010) (Tabled by Sen. J Ludwig, Special 
Minister of State (Cth) (Austl.)), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/house/ 
committee/laca/whistleblowing/report/governmentresponse.pdf [hereinafter 
Comprehensive Scheme] (“The Government will further consider options to protect 
persons who make disclosures under the scheme from detrimental treatment in the 
workplace which occurs as a result of making the disclosure.”). 
197 See Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (Austl.). 
198 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1317AB, AC, AD (Austl.). 
199 Id. 
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reprisal claims.200 In October 2009, a review of the provisions was initiated 
by the federal treasury and attorney general, but the review did not identify 
these problems as priorities for reform and it was never formally 
concluded.201 No known actions (criminal or civil) have been brought under 
the provisions in the eight years of their existence. 
The almost total failure of the anti-retaliation model, as an element of 
Australian whistleblowing law, raises many questions. The provisions 
(where they exist) are highly rudimentary, even by comparison to the US 
provisions that originally inspired them. Moreover, as a general rule they 
have been conceived and enacted without reference to the most relevant 
avenues for ensuring organizational justice through Australia’s workplace 
relations or industrial relations system. This system is highly developed by 
comparison to the United States, and instead bears closer resemblance to 
that of the United Kingdom where it was taken up as the natural home for a 
patently more successful system of whistleblower compensation in 1998.202 
It is only recently that restructuring of Australia’s workplace relations 
system under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and new uniform national 
health and safety laws has made the prospect of more seamless 
whistleblower protection laws more possible.203 Part of the explanation for 
the lack of success also lies in a drift of policymaking in the 1990s away 
                                                                                                                              
200 Id. 
201 See ATT’Y GEN. DEP’T, IMPROVING PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE 
WHISTLEBLOWERS: OPTIONS PAPER (2009) (Cth) (Austl.), available at 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1620/RTF/whistleblowers_options_paper.rtf. 
202 See, e.g., Hon. Jeremy McMullen, Ten Years of Employment Protection for 
Whistleblowers in the UK: A View from the Employment Appeal Tribunal, in A GLOBAL 
APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM EXISTING 
WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH? 7 (2010). 
203 See Workplace Relations (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (Austl.); Fair Work Act 2009 
(Cth) (Austl.); Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); New South Wales v 
Commonwealth [2006] 231 ALR 1 (Austl.). See generally SAFE WORK AUSTRALIA, 
http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (listings of model 
uniform workplace health and safety laws). 
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from employment-based approaches to protection. This drift was due to 
arguments that whistleblowing should be given “as broad a definition as 
possible to include disclosures by people from within or outside the 
organization”204—not just those disclosures protectable through workplace-
based relationships. Because these relationships lie at the heart of 
whistleblowing, however, the result of this broader approach has instead 
been that there is no effective protection for anyone. At the time of writing, 
the new federal public sector bills both offer a new direction, more 
consistent with the United Kingdom regime, by returning to the earlier 
recommendation and by proposing to connect whistleblower compensation 
rights to the remedial avenues available under the Fair Work Act 2009.205 
Whether this will be achieved, and if so, how well it will work, will only be 
known with time. 
B. Structural/Institutional 
While the anti-retaliation model has a poor track record, there is evidence 
of greater success from the other focuses in Australian whistleblowing laws. 
More than in US law, legislation at the Australian state level (and proposed 
for the federal public sector) has concentrated on structural and institutional 
regimes aimed at preventing and minimizing retaliation by ensuring that 
whistleblowers have effective means of disclosure, are responded to, and, 
theoretically, are supported and protected. The approach had only thin 
statutory effects at the outset. For example, the first South Australian 
legislation provided no such detail regarding internal disclosure procedures, 
investigative responsibilities, or whistleblower support.206 A future 
                                                                                                                              
204 See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, ¶ 2.12. 
205 See Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) s 41 
(Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2012 (Cth) Schedule Items 1-4 (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Bill 
2013 (Cth) s 18 (Austl.). 
206 See Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) (Austl.). 
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commonwealth ombudsman, John McMillan, noted that the Act imposed 
“no obligation upon agencies to define a whistleblowing procedure.”207 
However, this criticism reinforces the importance being placed on this 
structural approach, even at that time. 
By contrast, the major review leading to the Queensland legislation gave 
a high priority to the structural approach,208 and the law itself required that 
any public service manager, internal auditor, or investigative authority, in 
addition to designated officers, must be ready to receive and recognize 
whistleblowing disclosures.209 Federal parliamentary committees reinforced 
the approach.210 Recently, the structural approach has continued to expand. 
For example, the Queensland legislation always provided that every public 
agency “must establish reasonable procedures to protect its officers from 
reprisals that are, or may be, taken against them by the entity or other 
officers of the entity.”211 The legislation was reformed in 2010 to follow the 
precedent set by other states (principally Victoria and Western Australia), 
specifying in detail the obligations on organizations to recognize and 
manage disclosures, and to require a lead oversight agency to specify 
guidelines with which organizations’ own internal disclosure procedures 
must then comply.212 
Australian Capital Territory legislation from 2012 sets out the latest, 
current best practice framework.213 The approach is also taken up in the 
                                                                                                                              
207 SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, ¶ 4.46. 
208 QUEENSL. ELECTORAL AND ADMIN. REVIEW COMM’N, REPORT ON PROTECTION OF 
WHISTLEBLOWERS A11-12 (1991). 
209 See Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) ss 26-27 (Austl.) (current version at 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 17 (Austl.)); see also Public Disclosure Act 
2012 (ACT) s 15 (Austl.). 
210 See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, ¶ 9.31. 
211 Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 44 (Austl.) (current version at Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) ss 28, 49, 60 (Austl.)). 
212 See id. 
213 See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT) ss 28, 33 (Austl.). 
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current federal public sector bills, mentioned earlier.214 Specific innovations 
include statutory requirements for retaliation risks to be assessed and 
managed from the outset of internal disclosure receipt.215 The approach 
contrasts with US approaches because it focuses strongly on internal 
whistleblowing procedures and management obligations, including 
preventative support, as opposed to the creation of whistleblowing channels 
to independent agencies. More recently, the approach has also been 
bolstered by stronger systems of external oversight, usually by the relevant 
government ombudsman.216 However, internal disclosure procedures remain 
at its core. 
Large gaps in the take-up of the structural approach remain. For example, 
it is non-existent in the private sector. The transparency reforms introduced 
into corporate law in 2004 did not even go as far as SOX; yet, no equivalent 
of Dodd-Frank has yet been introduced. Instead, a voluntary Australian 
standard may be used.217 Further, the empirical research shows that while 
public-sector organizations can be quite good at developing and 
implementing procedures to encourage whistleblowing and act on the 
disclosures, they are far less proficient in developing and implementing 
procedures to protect and support their staff.218 Serious questions remain 
                                                                                                                              
214 See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7. 
215 See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT) s 33(2) (Austl.); Public Interest 
Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) ss 34(b), 35(2)(e) and (f) (Austl.); 
Public Interest Disclosure Bill 2013 (Cth) s 59(1) (Austl.). 
216 See Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) s 20(A)(3) (Austl.), for a discussion 
on how the Act gives the NSW Ombudsman a powerful oversight and lead agency role. 
See also Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) (Austl.) (discussing where the new 
oversight role was initially allocated to the Public Service Commission, but has recently 
been transferred to the Ombudsman); Public Service and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act 2012 (Qld) (Austl.). 
217 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN STANDARD, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS FOR 
ENTITIES (2003), available at http://fairwhistleblower.ca/files/fair/docs/Australian% 
20Standard%20AS%208004-2003.pdf. 
218 See A.J. Brown & Jane Olsen, Internal Witness Support: The Unmet Challenge, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING THE THEORY AND 
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about the adequacy of legislative requirements governing the role of 
oversight agencies and their preparedness to assist whistleblowers when 
organizational trust breaks down.219 Nevertheless, there is clear evidence 
that agencies that take their responsibilities to whistleblowers seriously—
and many do—achieve better outcomes in the management of 
whistleblowing than agencies that do not.220 Thus, in Australia, more than in 
the United States, there are some signs of success from the implementation 
of structural or institutional approaches, at least in the public sector, and 
these approaches have potential for greater success in the future. 
C. Media/Public Whistleblowing 
In addition to efforts to strengthen the structural approaches, the most 
dramatic area of recent Australian reform, contrasting even more strongly 
with US reform, is the growing statutory recognition of the role of 
whistleblowing to the media. Australia has no equivalent to the First 
Amendment and no broad constitutional protection of free speech relevant 
to public whistleblowing, whether by public servants or others. Since 1994, 
the High Court has recognized a more limited, implied freedom of political 
communication.221 This was used in one instance to overturn a blanket 
                                                                                                                              
PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS  
203 (2008); Peter Roberts, Evaluating Agency Responses: Comprehensiveness and the 
Impact of Whistleblowing Procedures, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS 
MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 233 (2008). 
219 See Lindy Annakin, In the Public Interest or Out of Desperation? The Experience of 
Australian Whistleblowers Reporting to Accountability Agencies (Mar. 2011) 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney), available at 
http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/7904/1/l_annakin_2011_thesis.pdf. 
220 See Roberts, supra note 218; PETER ROBERTS, A.J. BROWN & JANE OLSEN, 
WHISTLING WHILE THEY WORK: A GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE FOR MANAGING INTERNAL 
REPORTING OF WRONGDOING IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS (2011). 
221 See Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm’n [2003] 204 
ALR 119 (Austl.) (questioning the validity of Public Service Regulation 7(13), 
prohibiting a federal employee from disclosing “directly or indirectly, to any person any 
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regulation banning federal public servants from releasing any official 
information whatsoever without permission.222 
Instead, as traditionally was the case under English law, the principal 
protection for public revelation by whistleblowers lay in a common law 
public interest defense to actions for a criminal or civil breach of 
confidentiality.223 By 1994, however, the Senate Select Committee on 
Public Interest Whistleblowing noted that the scope and relevance of this 
defense in modern circumstances was extremely unclear.224 Since then, it 
has been increasingly accepted that statutory protection should include 
disclosure to the media where such disclosure is “excusable in all the 
circumstances,” taking into account “the seriousness of the allegations, 
reasonable belief in their accuracy, and reasonable belief that to make a 
disclosure along other channels might be futile or result in the 
whistleblower being victimised.”225 
At first, only one Australian jurisdiction moved to operationalize this 
principle—and inadequately. The Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) 
recognized public whistleblowing by including a “journalist” among the 
persons to whom a disclosure could be made, as a last resort, provided the 
disclosure was “substantially true.”226 This nevertheless made NSW the first 
jurisdiction, possibly worldwide, to legislate what is now known as a three-
                                                                                                                              
information about public business or anything of which the employee has official 
knowledge.”); see also Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 70(2) (Austl.). See generally 
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, SECRECY LAWS AND OPEN GOVERNMENT IN 
AUSTRALIA: REPORT 112 (2009), available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/ 
pdfs/publications/ALRC112.pdf. 
222 Bennett, 204 ALR 119 (Austl.). 
223 See Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 L.J. 113 (Austl.); Allied Mills Ltd v Trade Practices 
Comm’n (1980) 55 FLR 125 (Austl.); Attn’y Gen. (UK) v Heinemann Publishers (1987) 
75 ALR 461 (Austl.). 
224 See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, at ¶ 8.27. 
225 Id. ¶ 9.130. 
226 See Protection Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) s 19 (Austl.) (current version at Public 
Interest Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) s 19 (Austl.)) for a definition of “Journalist.” 
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tiered model of internal, regulatory, and public whistleblowing,227 more 
widely recognizable since the enactment of the Public Interest Disclosure 
Act 1998 (UK) four years later.228 
By contrast, other early legislation took different, confusing approaches.  
South Australia’s Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 did not necessarily 
disturb the common law position, but also did not expressly incorporate public 
disclosure. Its architect described the provisions as intended to “deter 
whistleblowing allegations being sensationalised inappropriately through 
the media,” due to “the justifiable need for a politically neutral and 
impartial public service to keep some matters confidential while serving the 
government of the day.”229 In Queensland, the Whistleblower Protection 
Act 1994 positively neutralized any remnant common law principle by 
excluding the media from the “appropriate” persons to whom disclosures 
could be made.230 The logic of this—that good internal and regulatory 
whistleblowing regimes should prevent any need for whistleblowers to ever 
go public—was repeated as late as 2006 in official advice that “untested 
allegations” aired in the media could “unjustly bring the person against 
whom the allegations are made into disrepute[,] . . . prejudice the conduct of 
the investigation[,]” and “unnecessarily disrupt the workplace.”231 
Recently, significant reform has re-established disclosure to the media as 
                                                                                                                              
227 See Wim Vandekerckhove, European Whistleblower Protection: Tiers or Tears?, in A 
GLOBAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM 
EXISTING WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH? 16-17 (2008)  (describing 
the three-tiered model). 
228 See Employment Rights Act, 1996, §§ 43G, 43H (U.K.) (current version at Public 
Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, (U.K.)). 
229 M.R. Goode, A Guide to the South Australian Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993, 
AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW NEWSLETTER NO. 13, 1993, at 14; 
see SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, at ¶ 4.43. 
230 See Whistleblower Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 25 (Austl.). 
231 OFFICE OF THE PUB. SERV. COMM’R, REVIEW OF THE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
PROTECTION ACT 1994 (Qld) 18 (2006), available at http://www.psc.qld.gov.au/ 
library/document/catalogue/equity-ethics-grievance/review-whistleblowers-protection-
act-report.pdf. 
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a firm part of best practice whistleblowing laws, at least for the public 
sector. In 2007, the incoming federal government committed to the reversal 
of a draconian approach to the treatment of whistleblowers and 
journalists.232 It matched the NSW approach by protecting any 
whistleblower who “has gone through the available official channels, but 
has not had success within a reasonable timeframe and . . . where the 
whistleblower is clearly vindicated by their disclosure.”233 Right to Know, a 
coalition of media organizations commissioned an audit of government 
secrecy that recommended that legislation should at least protect 
“whistleblowers who disclose to the media after a reasonable attempt to 
have the matter dealt with internally or where such a course was 
impractical.”234 The results of the empirical research, released in September 
2008, reinforced this position.235 
Since that time, four jurisdictions have moved to recognize public or 
media whistleblowing as a formal part of the regime—Queensland, Western 
Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and, in principle, the federal 
government.  In 2010, Queensland’s new Public Interest Disclosure Act 
adapted and liberalized the NSW provision from sixteen years earlier.236 
The NSW provision now provides that whistleblowers will retain legal 
                                                                                                                              
232 See A.J. Brown, Privacy and The Public Interest Disclosures: When is it Reasonable 
to Protect ‘Whistleblowing’ to The Media?, PRIVACY L. BULL.,  Aug. 2007, at 19, 19–28, 
available at http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/151274/brown-
aug2007.pdf, for an overview of these cases. 
233 Kevin Rudd & Joe Ludwig, Government Information: Restoring Trust and Integrity, 
AUSTRALIAN LABOR 1, 10 (2007), available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/ 
download/library/partypol/EFRO6/upload_binary/efro62.pdf;fileType=application% 
2Fpdf#search=%22ALP%20library%20d-g%22. 
234 Press Release, Irene Moss, Chair, Australia’s Right to Know Report on the 
Independent Audit into the State of Free Speech in Australia (Oct. 31, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
235 See Brown et al., supra note 179. 
236 See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 20(4) (Austl.) (defining “Journalist” to 
mean “a person engaged in the occupation of writing or editing material intended for 
publication in the print or electronic news media”). 
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protection if they take a public interest disclosure to a journalist after they 
have first taken it to an official authority and that authority has either 
“decided not to investigate or deal with the disclosure,” not recommended 
any action, or failed to notify the whistleblower whether the disclosure was 
to be investigated.237 While only providing for media disclosures after 
official channels have been tried, this provision was arguably the most 
liberal of its kind in the world—given parliamentary confirmation that it 
included facility for officials to go public, more or less immediately, in the 
face of a simple “deemed refusal” to respond to an internal disclosure.238 
A similar reform has since been introduced to Western Australia’s Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 2003.239 Most significantly, an even more thoughtful 
approach was introduced in reforms to the Australian Capital Territory’s 
legislation. Under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT), a 
whistleblower may make a public interest disclosure to a journalist if an 
official authority has committed the following: “refused or failed to 
investigate” the disclosure; given no response or progress report on a 
disclosure in three months; or investigated but proposed no action in 
circumstances where there remains “clear evidence” of the disclosed 
conduct.240 In addition to striking this new, arguably more sustainable 
balance as to when whistleblowers should go public, the same provision 
was the first in Australia to permit a whistleblower to go public without first 
making an internal or regulatory disclosure, if going to the authorities 
                                                                                                                              
237 Id. 
238 See Qld, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 Sept. 2010, 3413 
(Austl.), available at http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/hansard/2010/2010_ 
09_16_WEEKLY.pdf. See generally A.J. Brown, Flying Foxes, WikiLeaks and Freedom 
of Speech: Statutory Recognition of Public Whistleblowing in Australia, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 86 (2011) [hereinafter Brown, Flying 
Foxes]. 
239 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA), s 7A (Austl.), as inserted by Evidence and 
Public Interest Disclosure Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (WA) (Austl.). 
240 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (Aust. Cap. Terr.) s 27 (Austl.). 
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would involve a “significant risk of detrimental action” and be 
“unreasonable in all the circumstances.”241 In another refinement, the 
whistleblower only retains protection if he or she only discloses to 
journalists what is “reasonably necessary” to achieve action.242 This is in 
line with objectives of whistleblower protection, and with the needs of 
whistleblowers, while precluding misuse of the legislation to agitate 
collateral causes or release information other than that relating to the 
unresolved elements of the disclosure. 
The fourth Australian jurisdiction in which policy change has occurred is 
the federal one. To date, the only actual action taken by the federal 
government has been to enact a journalism “shield law” that strengthens 
journalists’ ability to protect the identity of confidential sources—including 
whistleblowers—by affording a legal privilege to refuse to reveal the 
identity of sources in court.243 However, in line with the policy shift towards 
protection of disclosure to the media, the key House of Representatives 
inquiry in 2009 recommended that this form of disclosure must be 
incorporated in the proposed federal whistleblowing regime: “[E]xperience 
has shown that internal processes can sometimes fail[,] . . . that the 




243 Evidence Amendment (Journalist’ Privilege) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.). For background 
on the reform of the Evidence Act, see Matthew Tracey, Journalist Shield Laws, 
COMMC’N LAW BULLETIN, Vol 29.2, 2010, at 12, available at http://www.camla.org.au/ 
clb/CLB%20-%20Volume%2029,%20Issue%202.pdf; Media Entm’t and Arts Alliance, 
Official Spin: Censorship and Control of The Australian Press, AUSTRALIAN POLICY 
ONLINE, 2007, at 8–10, available at http://apo.org.au/research/official-spin-censorship-
and-control-australian-press; Chris Merritt, Whistleblowers Shun New Laws Planned by 
Canberra, AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/news/ 
whistleblowers-shun-new-laws-planned-by-canberra/story-e6frg906-1225699707935; 
Chris Merritt, Coalition Promise to Introduce Shield Laws Prompts Labor to Re-examine 
its Position, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/ 
legal-affairs/coalition-promise-to-introduce-shield-laws-prompts-labor-to-re-examine-its-
position/story-e6frg97x-1225907500898. 
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issue and that a subsequent disclosure to the media could serve the public 
interest”; any other approach would simply “lack credibility.”244 While the 
committee’s recommendation was limited,245 the federal government’s 
response in March 2010 was more liberal, promising that the legislation 
would protect public whistleblowing as a first resort where there is a 
“substantial and imminent danger or harm to life or public health and safety, 
and there are exceptional circumstances” excusing the lack of a prior 
internal or regulatory disclosure.  It also stated that whistleblowing to the 
media would be protected as a last resort wherever the disclosure relates to 
a “serious matter” and the “public interest in disclosure outweighs 
countervailing public interest factors (e.g., protection of international 
relations, national security, cabinet deliberations).”246 This last qualification 
may yet prove to nullify the value of the measure, especially since the 
government also announced that public whistleblowing would not be 
protected where it involved “intelligence-related information.”247 
Controversy, hence, remains, as the current federal bills take divergent 
approaches to how this principle should be implemented and what 
circumstances it will cover.248 Nevertheless, the basic principle is clear—
public or media whistleblowing will be built into the federal scheme, if or 
when enacted. 
No equivalent movement to protect public whistleblowing is occurring in 
the Australian private sector. This is notwithstanding the fact that, arguably, 
                                                                                                                              
244 STANDING COMM., supra note 194, at 162–64. 
245 Id. at 164–65 (showing that this was similar to the position recommended but not 
enacted in Queensland in 1993, and to some more recent overseas legislation, such as that 
in Manitoba, Canada: Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Act 2006, 
C.C.S.M. c. P217 (Manitoba), s 14(1) (Can.)). Cf. Canada’s Federal Public Servants 
Disclosure Protection Act 2005, S.C. 2005, c. 46, s 16(1) (Can.).  
246 Comprehensive Scheme, supra note 195. 
247 Id. 
248 See Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) ss 31–33 
(Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Bill 2013 (Cth) s 26(1), Table, Items 2 and 3 (Austl.). 
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some protection of whistleblowing to the media remains just as important 
for private-sector accountability as for the public sector in the age of 
corporate social responsibility, environmental and consumer protection, and 
market transparency. 
In any event, the key logic of this reform now extends beyond either 
simple clarification of a confused common law position, or acceptance of 
the political reality that public whistleblowing is going to occur and be 
valued. In addition, statutory recognition of the media as a third tier of the 
regime now represents a deliberate “driver” for change, providing official 
sanction to the risk of the “front page test” if public institutions fail to 
improve their integrity systems, or support for their employees. It 
institutionalizes the principle stated by a veteran political journalist, Laurie 
Oakes, that “leaks are the difference between a democracy and an 
authoritarian society. . . . [T]he risk of being found out via leaks makes 
those in authority think twice about telling porkies [lies], performing their 
duties sloppily, behaving badly, or rorting [abusing] the system.”249 As 
such, the focus on public whistleblowing works in conjunction with other 
models, being intended partly to promote organizational justice and combat 
retaliation and partly to extend the structural or institutional model to 
include “unofficial” channels. 
D. Bounty/Reward Models 
While the Australian track record in respect to public or media 
whistleblower protection contrasts with that of the United States, an even 
larger contrast exists regarding reward or bounty approaches. Despite the 
                                                                                                                              
249 Laurie Oakes, Pillars of Democracy Depend on Leaks, THE BULLETIN / NAT’L NINE 
NEWS (Aug. 24, 2005), http://news.ninemsn.com.au; see also LAURIE OAKES, ON THE 
RECORD: POLITICS, POLITICIANS, AND POWER 295 (2010) (leaking is best defined to 
mean the unauthorized disclosure of inside information). Not all leaking is necessarily 
whistleblowing, any more than all whistleblowing necessarily involves leaking, but when 
it comes to public whistleblowing, the effect is the same. Id. 
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common precepts of whistleblower protection in both countries, in Australia 
this approach has been almost entirely officially eschewed. The primary 
reasons appear to be cultural; Australians have a different response to the 
issue of propriety. 
In 1989, one of the first parliamentary inquiries to consider copying some 
of the US whistleblower provisions was assembled in response to exposure 
of insider trading in private sector regimes.250 The inquiry concluded that 
any system of rewards or bounties was “incompatible with current attitudes 
in relation to the credibility of evidence. . . . [a]nd with accepted principles 
and practice within Australian society.”251 
In 1994, the Senate Select Committee also recommended firmly against 
establishment of any system of rewards for whistleblowing, even in relation 
to fraud.252 According to the committee, whistleblowers “are not motivated 
by the thought of reward, rather they are generally motivated by public 
interest,” making rewards inapt.253 A “general agreement” existed among 
those who addressed the issue that rewards or bounties should not be 
encouraged.254 Other inquiries also concluded that it was simply “a citizen’s 
duty to report fraud, theft etc.,” “part of the responsibilities of public 
servants to do the same,” and that there was “no proof” that reward systems 
promote whistleblowing.255 Even Dr. William de Maria, a prominent 
Australian whistleblowing researcher, criticized US-style “bounty hunting” 
as “an incorrect and dangerous inducement on which to expect people of 
goodwill to come forward,” preferring instead that they “come forward on 
the old fashioned basis of just being ethically disturbed with what they 
                                                                                                                              
250 See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL 
AFFAIRS, FAIR SHARES FOR ALL: INSIDER TRADING IN AUSTRALIA 45 (1989), at ¶ 5.50. 
251 Id.  ¶ 5.50. 
252 See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7 at ¶ 11.20. 
253 Id. ¶ 2.20. 
254 Id. ¶ 5.44. 
255 Id. ¶ 11.18. 
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see.”256 
Assumptions biased against the use of rewards or bounties appear to be 
softening. A 2009 House of Representatives inquiry received much stronger 
evidence and arguments that qui tam provisions could play a useful role in 
whistleblowing law reform, and accepted that provisions such as those 
contained in the US FCA had “an important role” at least in combating 
fraud.257 The committee did not reach a conclusion on the issue of rewards, 
citing the fact that its main focus lay on “public interest disclosures within 
the Australian Government public sector concerning the conduct of public 
officials.”258 Nevertheless, while the political environment is increasingly 
fertile for a shift towards a reward system, there remains no specific 
movement towards the take-up of such provisions in respect to either the 
public or private sectors. 
IV. ANALYSIS: FOUR OPTIONS, MODELS, OR STRANDS? 
A. Contrasting Histories 
What do these contrasting legal histories tell us about the preferred 
direction of whistleblower law reform? While the United States and 
Australia are both post-colonial federations with often-similar constitutional 
and legal structures, there are significant differences between the countries, 
particularly in terms of population and economic size. It is also clear that a 
federal public-sector whistleblowing regime has been much slower to 
materialize in any form in Australia than in the United States, and efforts 
towards the development of private-sector whistleblowing regimes in 
Australia, even those based on the original anti-retaliation model, have been 
even slower to ripen. A full account of the reasons for all the relevant 
                                                                                                                              
256 See id. ¶ 11.15. 
257 STANDING COMM., supra note 194, at ¶ 5.51. 
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differences is beyond the scope of this article. 
Nevertheless, the aggregation of laws in both countries shows four 
distinct legislative models or options at work: anti-retaliation or 
organizational justice; reward or bounty; institutional or structural; and 
public or media. Clear identification of these different strategies and options 
is significant because until recently, there has been little by way of 
theoretical overview to explain these apparently disparate approaches. 
Indeed, in the absence of an integrative picture, they have tended to unfold 
as competing models. In both countries, jurisdictions appear to have lurched 
for better solutions in a relatively blind fashion, looking for something more 
effective or persuasive, without necessarily evaluating why the previous 
effort did not work, or whether the strategies might be more effectively 
brought together. 
To date, comparative legal analysis has only been of limited assistance.  
Analysis has looked across different jurisdictions in order to produce lists of 
principles that unite, or that could be used as a guide to the design of, 
whistleblowing legislation in different places.259 Such principles help 
highlight that the comprehensive adoption of all potentially desirable 
elements of a whistleblowing law, in any country, occurs rarely if ever. 
However, these principles may not necessarily assist the process of law 
reform because of the tendency of government to pick and choose those that 
                                                                                                                              
259 See, e.g., Paul Latimer, Whistleblowing in the Financial Services Sector, 21 UNIV. OF 
TASMANIA L. REV. 39 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2088807; David Lewis, Employment Protection For Whistleblowers: On 
What Principles Should Australian Legislation Be Based?, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. OF LAB. L. 1 
(1996); Brown et al., supra note 179, at 271–77; David Banisar, Whistleblowing: 
International Standards and Developments, in CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY: 
DEBATING THE FRONTIERS BETWEEN STATE, MARKET AND SOCIETY (2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1753180; ANJA OSTERHAUS & 
CRAIG FAGAN, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ALTERNATIVE TO SILENCE: WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION IN 10 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (2009), available at 
http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Hinweisgebersysteme/TI_ 
Alternative%20to%20Silence_2009.pdf. 
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are easiest to adopt, without a clear understanding of their relative 
importance or the possibility that, in fact, all the principles are vital. 
As the histories attest, whistleblowing law reform is made especially 
complex by the different fields of policy, regulation, and law that are 
spanned by the legislation to date. These fields include the following: 
employment law (public and private), in terms of both basic employment 
rights and specific disciplinary and misconduct regimes; workplace health 
and safety law; law pertaining to administrative justice; institutional 
accountability and open government (or, in the private sector, regulation 
relating to corporate transparency and social responsibility); media law; and 
constitutional law. With policymaking and regulation divided into very 
distinct silos in both societies, an integrated approach is plainly a challenge. 
However, the “second round” divergence in the US and Australian law 
reforms helps identify both the need for, and possible nature of, such an 
integrated approach. The four models, or approaches, revealed to be at work 
in both places, already have a range of relationships and, it would seem, 
could benefit from more connection. The models may also provide evidence 
to support recent attempts by analysts and researchers to find an overall 
framework for mapping the different legal dimensions involved in 
whistleblowing laws. For example, the leading analysis, by Professor 
Robert Vaughn of the Washington College of Law, identifies four different 
“perspectives” at work in the field of whistleblowing law, which influence 
the character of legal standards and the scope of protections in any case: (1) 
an employment perspective; (2) an open-government perspective; (3) a 
market or regulatory perspective; and (4) a human rights perspective.260 
According to Vaughn, these perspectives do not simply label aspects of 
whistleblower laws, but emphasize differing justifications, demonstrate 
connection with distinct bodies of law containing their own theories and 
                                                                                                                              
260 See VAUGHN, supra note 158, at ch. 15. 
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assumptions, and present different criteria for success and failure. As shown 
in Figure 1, they also relate to one another in a variety of ways: some 
embody greater concern with individual rights, while others demonstrate a 
greater concern with institutional reform; and some are likely to address the 
public sector, while others address the private sector.  





Significantly, there is some correlation between Vaughn’s picture and the 
four main legislative models or options that emerge from the country 
comparisons above. Measures that deploy these models, separately or in a 
mixture, can be seen as providing different types of incentives, both to 
whistleblowing and to organizational or political responsiveness to 
whistleblowing. Public or media provisions align strongly with the public 
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dimension in Figure 1; the institutional or structural model aligns with the 
institutional reform dimension; the original anti-retaliation approach aligns 
with an individual rights dimension; and the reward or bounty model 
aligns—although perhaps less neatly—with the private dimension. 
This consonance may be, in part, because Vaughn is drawing his lessons 
from similar reference points of history. Nevertheless, it tends to confirm 
that rather than treating these approaches as competing alternatives, to be 
tried as each previous approach fails, it may be important to evaluate the 
extent to which previous difficulties are flowing from a failure to realize 
how these different dimensions and options interrelate. 
In fact, it may be better to view them not as alternative models, but rather 
as four strands that would be best woven together in a more complementary 
fashion. As Vaughn notes, the different perspectives may conflict, with 
these conflicts also helping explain some of the areas—especially anti-
retaliation provisions—in which whistleblowing measures have had greatest 
difficulty.262 But overall, Vaughn’s picture and these comparisons tend to 
reinforce that unless legal strategies in these disparate areas are recognized 
and reconciled in the legislative process, truly effective whistleblowing 
regimes may remain elusive. Clearly, no individual segmented approach is 
providing a total solution in and of itself. Accordingly, these histories tend 
to suggest that it will be where these different perspectives can be 
reconciled, integrated, and deployed in a mutually-reinforcing fashion that 
prospects of achieving the intended outcomes would appear greatest. 
B. Lessons for the Future? 
Left to its present, often chaotic course, the pattern of law reform 
described in the previous parts looks likely to continue. In each country, 
pressures for new and different approaches stems, at least in large part, from 
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the failure of the original anti-retaliation approach, to a significant degree in 
the United States and almost totally in Australia. Twenty years later, 
however, the “second round” divergence in approaches between the 
countries can be seen to stem not from systematic acknowledgement of that 
failure, but rather as a resort to try different alternative measures in each 
country that are assumed to be more effective.   
In Australia, a major question is whether the focus on rewards and 
bounties prevalent in whistleblowing regimes in the United States will ever 
be adopted. The best guess is that rewards and bounties will indeed be taken 
up, but differently than in the United States, due to the significant 
differences in context between the two countries. The size of government 
and the economy in the United States means that the scale of rewards 
payable as a percentage of either proven fraud on government, or of 
regulatory penalties in the private sector, is always likely to be significantly 
greater, in most cases, than could be achieved from equivalent cases in a 
small-to-mid sized economy such as Australia’s economy. A high 
consciousness is likely to remain in Australia that reward and bounty 
mechanisms only relate to one fragment of the whistleblowing agenda. 
Likely, these mechanisms would only be applied to those circumstances 
where wrongdoing results in financially quantifiable losses, as opposed to 
many other types of damage or harm, or where financial penalties are 
imposed. 
For these reasons, it is likely that reward/bounty mechanisms will 
continue to be eschewed with respect to public-sector whistleblower 
protection. However, they likely will be introduced as part of the armory of 
regulation for the private sector, and thus become available to corporate 
whistleblowers. This prediction is reinforced by the prominence of 
whistleblower protection as one element of international anti-corruption and 
accountability reforms being developed through the G-20 group of nations 
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in the wake of the most recent financial crisis.263 Reforms such as Dodd-
Frank have increased salience for all developed countries, which is a natural 
result of the increased globalization of accountability and anti-corruption 
strategies in response to globalized business and economic risks. As a 
highly engaged member of the G-20, Australia is likely to be increasingly 
sympathetic to such international strategies, irrespective of previous cultural 
and political differences that may have meant significant differences in 
sympathy for rewards. 
In the United States, in light of the successful but partial reach of the 
reward model, it can be predicted that the institutional/structural approach 
pursued in more comprehensive ways in Australia is also likely to expand. 
In addition, if Congress permits, movement to bolster the legislative 
protection that attaches to whistleblowing to the media will likely develop 
consistently with First Amendment traditions. Similarly, despite the 
existence of the constitutional “reporter’s privilege,” pressure remains for 
US journalism “shield laws,” like those in Australia, to be passed—even 
though, like previous attempts to amend the WPA, two such reform bills 
recently died after four years in development.264 
It remains to be seen whether each country is likely to address the 
substantial failure of the original anti-retaliation model. The answer in each 
country is likely to be different. The nature and scale of the challenges that 
confound US employment law are too large to canvas here. However, in 
general, the absence of a more regulated approach to industrial relations 
likely means that use of anti-retaliation measures as a means of 
                                                                                                                              
263 See Annex III: G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan, G20 INFO. CTR., 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-anticorruption.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
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264 See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007); see, e.g., 
Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter’s Privilege in 
Any Form, 63 FED. COMM. L. J. 667, 688 (2011), available at 
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compensating whistleblowers and changing organizational behavior is 
likely to remain an ongoing, piecemeal battle. While regulators such as the 
OSC may recently be inclined to engage in this battle with more energy and 
effectiveness than previously, at least for the public sector,265 more 
substantial questions are likely to remain. 
The potential response in Australia, however, is somewhat clearer. It is 
now increasingly understood that the decision of most Australian 
legislatures to copy the US civil action compensation provisions—rather 
than embed compensation provisions in Australia’s existing framework of 
industrial relations and employment rights—may not have been the wisest 
choice. The relative simplicity with which the United Kingdom was able to 
achieve the second of these approaches in 1998 tends to underscore the 
misdirected nature of Australian choices to not work with existing 
framework. On paper, it should be relatively simple for Australia to rectify 
this mistake and also embed the whistleblowing duties and obligations of 
employees and employers in its employment law regimes—especially since 
consolidation of these regimes since 2006—as indicated by the most recent 
law reform proposals. 
The primary obstacle to taking this path appears to have been a 
conceptual one. As can be seen from the strength of focus on the 
structural/institutional and public/media dimensions, whistleblowing 
legislation is perceived primarily as a public accountability or open-
government measure, rather than as a measure also aimed at individual and 
organizational justice. As Vaughn notes, however, too strong a focus on 
open government inevitably “shows less concern with injury to the 
                                                                                                                              
265 See Mark Cohen, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at Whistleblowing for 
Change: Leveraging Whistleblower Protection Laws to Promote Whistleblowing in the 
Public Interest(March 11, 2013). 
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employment relationship.”266 He writes: 
Although the employment relationship generates necessary 
information and employment actions may be the principal forms of 
retaliation, the open-government perspective is information-based 
rather than employment-based. This external focus generates 
justifications for protection in the open-government perspective 
that are at odds with some of the justifications supporting 
whistleblower protection in the employment one.267 
This may be why Australian governments appear satisfied if 
whistleblowing regimes are succeeding in flushing out information about 
wrongdoing and enabling it to be addressed, and have far less regard for the 
outcomes for whistleblowers themselves. In both countries, the priority 
appears to be a more integrated understanding of the perspectives that 
inform whistleblowing laws. Further, this understanding needs to be used to 
reinvent compensation provisions that are more tailored, lower-cost, and 
adaptive to the unique circumstances and types of damage that flow from 
failures in whistleblower support and protection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The answer to the question in the title of this article—The Money or the 
Media?—is that neither of these important focuses of recent whistleblowing 
law reform, in the United States and Australia, respectively, are likely to 
prove sufficient in and of themselves. Rather, this article has reviewed key 
developments in whistleblowing law reform in each country in order to 
arrive at a more coherent and integrated overview of how the general 
process of reform might best be approached. 
The first part charted the shift in focus from an original anti-retaliation or 
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organizational justice model of whistleblower protection in the United 
States, to recent expansion of the reward or bounty model, with some signs 
of development in institutional or structural approaches to embedding 
whistleblowing in the management and regulatory structures of 
organizations. Relatively absent was movement to expand the role of public 
or media whistleblowing as an element of the regimes. By contrast, the 
second part described the shift in focus in Australia from a similar original 
anti-retaliation or organizational justice model, to a major reliance on 
institutional or structural approaches, and, most recently, the expanded role 
of public or media whistleblowing with no significant development towards 
incorporating the reward or bounty model of whistleblowing. 
Despite the contrasting choices, the third part of the article discussed the 
significance of the fact that the same four distinct legislative models can be 
identified at work through these aggregations of laws.  The identification of 
these approaches aligns with other scholarship to help provide a new 
framework for understanding and evaluating the wisdom of legislative 
choices to date. Measures that deploy these models, separately or jointly, 
can be seen as providing different types of incentives, both to 
whistleblowing and to organizational or political responsiveness to 
whistleblowing. However, the piecemeal nature of reform choices in both 
countries tends to underscore the lack of an agreed understanding among 
policymakers of the different dimensions and models and bodies of law 
with which they are dealing. When law reform trends in each country are 
analyzed, recent activity can be seen to stem not from systematic 
acknowledgement of the failure of key approaches, but a resort to 
alternative measures with greater assumed effectiveness. 
In Australia, the failure of the original anti-retaliation approach and the 
need to supplement the institutional/structural approach has led, almost 
naturally, to new attempts to try other approaches. Indeed, we find it likely 
that the reward approach will also now be taken up, at least in part. 
However, in the United States, in light of the successful but necessarily 
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partial reach of the reward model, we predict that the institutional/structural 
approach long pursued in Australia is also likely to expand. 
This begs the question of what reforms are best to be pursued as each 
country also returns to the fundamental problem of the substantial failure of 
the original anti-retaliation model. As we have shown, each country is 
making at least some efforts to address this problem, at least for its federal 
public sector, but the problem itself remains very substantial. The ultimate 
answer in each country is likely to be different, but the objective remains 
the same. Overall, we conclude that legislative efforts that effectively 
integrate and reconcile these different approaches provide the most likely 
path to greater success in protecting whistleblowers and encouraging 
whistleblowing. 
 
